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ABSTRACT 
This thesis presents an empirical investigation of age-related differences in 
children's processing of advertising and subsequent persuasion. Limitations of paradigms 
used in past research on children's responses to advertising are identified: of particular 
concern is the rather cursory attention that has been given to involvement. This thesis 
investigates the potential for the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) to provide a more 
sophisticated perspective of children's processing of advertising and resultant persuasion. 
Thus, both children's abilities and motivations to process advertising are given much-
needed attention. Hypotheses are grounded in theories of children's information 
processing abilities that provide descriptions of expected age-related differences in 
children's processing of advertising. 
An experimental design for assessmg age-related differences in children's 
processing of advertising and resultant persuasion is presented. The implemented design 
was a 2 x 2 x 2 factorial experiment manipulating involvement with the ad (high/low) and 
assistance (assisted/not assisted) for children from two age groups (7-11 and 11-16) that 
have associated information processing abilities. Triangulation of measures, including 
thoughts produced during viewing, argument recognition, and formation of Attitude toward 
the Ad (Aad), Attitude toward the Brand (Ab), and Purchase Intention (PI), provide a 
holistic view of children's processing and persuasion. Thought and argument recognition 
analyses revealed mechanisms producing persuasion. Path analyses, using evaluations of 
central message arguments and peripheral cues as predictors of Aad, Ab, and PI, allowed 
persuasion to be specified as taken through the central or the peripheral routes. 
207 children from a single full-primary school participated in the experiment. The 
results reveal that even children as young as 8 years of age have the ability to take the 
central route to _per,suasion. In fact, whilst the older children exhibited greater ability to 
elaborate central message arguments and thereby greater potential ability to take the 
central route, the younger children exhibited an equivalent and in some cases superior 
tendency to form attitudes via the central route to persuasion. Implications for theory, 
management and public policy are discussed. Further research opportunities spring forth 
and are duly presented. 
Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Children as a Market 
The children's market is becoming of increasing importance to marketers, 
consumer researchers, parents and public policy makers alike. Societal changes such as 
dual income households and single-parent households have vested children with 
unprecedented responsibilities and power (Guber & Berry, 1993). Today's children are 
more sophisticated than their earlier counterparts, have more influence over spending, and 
more products to choose from as marketers realise opportunities. Kids have become astute 
consumers with extensive knowledge of brand names and advertising slogans. They 
discriminate amongst brands and value the concept of choice (Guber and Berry, 1993). 
Marketers have been showing increasing interest in the large and lucrative 
children's market. While advertisers have traditionally been concerned with selling toys, 
cereal, and candy to children, many new products are being developed specifically for kids. 
In recent years, the more traditional product lines have been extended and deepened. But 
some companies are going a step further and creating new products for children (McNeal, 
1998). Computer technology is now customised for kids. Other tailored products include 
prepared kids meals, cosmetics and toiletries, as well as kids versions of adult products 
such as Pert Plus (shampoo) for kids. Adult services have also been adapted for children, 
including banking and investment services, and hair and eye care services. McNeal 
distinguishes three distinct children's markets. These are the primary market, the influence 
market and the future market. 
The primary market is derived from 4-12 year old children spending their own 
money on their needs and wants. Children's purchasing power is on the rise, with the 
average 10-year-olds weekly income being estimated at $13.931 in 1997 (McNeal, 1998). 
Approximately one third of this income is spent on food and beverages, with the remainder 
distributed among a variety of products including playthings, clothing, movies and 
toiletries (McNeal, 1998). A subset of this market, the so called 8-12 year old "tweens'', 
were estimated to have spent $55.7 billion in 1999 (Rosenberg, 2000a). 
1 All quoted figures are for the US unless otherwise stated. 
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The influence market, which is also growing, consists of children influencing their 
parent's spending either directly by requesting a product for themselves or indirectly via 
children participating actively with other family members in a purchase decision (McNeal, 
1998). Direct influence (purchase requests) was estimated at $188 billion in 1997, while 
indirect influence may be as much as $300 billion. (McNeal, 1998). According to a recent 
parent poll, "children influence 40% of parent's purchases, while 65% of parents explicitly 
solicit children's opinions about products purchased for the entire household, including 
cars and computers" (Rosenberg, 2000a). 
When children are viewed as a future market, they have more market potential than 
their primary and influence purchases combined (McNeal, 1998). With the intent of 
creating loyal future customers, some companies wisely nurture kids as customers before 
they even have the power to buy their products (McNeal, 1998). Bank United 
demonstrated this kind of reasoning with the introduction of it's ATM look-alikes called 
Kids Talking Machines (KTM) targeted at children. Ron Coben, executive vice president 
for Bank United, said that "We thought that if we can get people started using Bank United 
as kids, there's no reason they'd not want to use us down the road" (King, 1999). 
The market potential of children is predicted to grow over the next decade at the 
double-digit rate seen in the past ten years (McNeal, 1998). Marketing to kids is not 
simple. A number of mistakes to date have stemmed from executives believing they fully 
understand children, either through using their own children as a reference point· or 
hearkening back to their childhood days (McNeal, 1998). 
1.2 Advertising to Children 
Children's advertising has been a controversial topic for decades, peaking in the late 
1970's, falling off in the "regulatory relaxed" 1980's, and gaining momentum over the 
1990's (Armstrong & Brucks, 1988). The debate has just gained prominence in Europe 
with the possibility of the new European Union president - Sweden - pushing for a 
Europe-wide ban (Higham, 1999). The proponents of advertising to children include 
advertisers and their agencies, advertising organisations, and others who favour self-
regulation. At the other pole of the debate are the regulators, children's activists, parent 
and consumer organisations, and others who favour restricting children's advertising or 
banning it completely (Armstrong & Brucks, 1988). For comprehensive discussions of the 
issues I refer the interested reader to Armstrong & Brucks (1988), Kunkel & Roberts 
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(1991), Bandyopadhyay, Kindra, and Sharp, (2001), and Furnham (2000). ill general 
terms, the critics claim that children's adve1iising is unfair because young children have 
neither the cognitive ability nor the life experience to deal with it effectively (Armstrong & 
Brucks, 1988). On the other hand, supporters of children's advertising assert that 
opponents underestimate children's' abilities and that children have the right to receive 
truthful and tasteful advertising information (Armstrong & Brucks, 1988). The issues are 
incredibly complex and the battle currently being waged promises to be a protracted, 
costly, and frustrating affair with little hope for a complete solution (Armstrong & Brucks, 
' 
1988). 
Nonetheless, the amount of money being spent on advertising is increasing steadily. 
In 1980, $110 million was spent on television by the three networks, while the total of 
broadcast advertising by the mid 1990s was estimated at over $350 million (Guber & 
Berry, 1993). Of products advertised directly to children, toys are the biggest advertiser on 
TV with 33% followed by various food categories, recreational products, records, books, 
school products, videos, phones, athletic shoes, toothpaste, household goods, personal care 
products, and clothes (Guber & Berry, 1993). 
Advertisers realise that children are a special audience and try to learn as much as 
they can about them. Advertising agencies have developed special units devoted entirely 
to providing in-depth knowledge of kid's ever-changing culture (Rosenburg, 2000b). 
Recommendations on suitable advertising styles and techniques are common in the 
literature, but unfortunately contain contradictions, particularly when comparing academic 
opinion with that of some practitioners. A dimension on which confusion lies is the 
amount of information that children can process. A tip from a respected agency is to 
"make the commercial move because children have high expectations and are capable of 
absorbing much more information in 30 seconds than adults absorb" (quoted in Kraak and 
Pelletier, 1998). This view of children's information processing abilities is in complete 
contrast to that reported in the academic literature which is that children are more limited 
processors of information than adults, particularly with regard to ability to handle large 
amounts of information (e.g. Piaget, 1953; Roedder, 1981; Flavell, Miller, and Miller, 
1991; Meadows, 1993). This latter school of thought suggests that advertisers "keep it 
simple" when dealing with children. 
Advertising - particularly television advertising - holds special meaning for children. 
Indeed, some authors have noted that advertising fulfils some special functions in children. 
Guber and Berry (1993) noted that to children the function of childhood is deciding what 
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they want to be. Children are naturally curious, wanting to know what everyone else does 
and likes in order to make their own choices easier. Kids bring that curiosity to advertising 
to find out what is new, to be entertained, and to find out what other kids are doing. 
Accordingly, they like commercials and may attend to them as much as programs (Guber 
& Berry, 1993). 
It is likely that advertising will continue to be developed as a marketing tool with 
which to communicate with children. Regarding the future of advertising, McNeal (1998) 
makes the prediction that ads encouraging questionable activity (e.g. defying parents) will 
be replaced with informative ads describing the benefits of products. As the importance of 
advertising to children increases, marketers will require greater knowledge about how to 
communicate effectively to this segment. 
1.3 The Advertising to Children Research Field 
Not surprisingly, there has been a large amount of research addressing the concerns 
of consumer researchers, marketers, and public policy makers. Most of the research is on 
the effects of television advertising on children. The research has progressed fitfully 
and been focused on particular problem areas dictated by the social and political contexts 
. of the time (Young, 1990). A central concern is that advertising directed at children 
exploits their vulnerability, so much research is aimed at describing children's advertising 
literacy at various ages (Young, 1990). Researchers have attempted to organise the 
research in a variety of ways, the most common relying on the assumption that the 
advertising message is processed in sequence, from watching the ad through to buying 
(Young, 1990). Raju and Lonial (1990) segmented the research into three broad areas: 
exposure to advertising, communication process effects, and communication outcome 
effects. 
The purpose of this thesis is to uncover the mechanisms by which children of 
various age groups process advertising stimuli and consequently form attitudes towards 
advertisements and brands. Chapter 2 reviews literature pertaining to how children process 
advertising and are subsequently persuaded. The review identifies limitations in past 





2.1 Past Perspectives on Children's Processing of Advertising and 
Persuasion 
Enhancing Children's Information Processing Skills 
Enhancing children's information processing abilities has been a common interest of 
most involved parties, marketers being the notable exception. Information processing 
theory provides a detailed description of children's information processing abilities at 
various ages. (Roedder, 1981 ). Framing age differences in terms of whether children have 
the ability to use storage and retrieval strategies, it yields three distinct age groups: 3-7, 
limited processors who do not have the ability to use storage or retrieval strategies; 7-11, 
cued processors who have the ability to use storage and retrieval strategies if appropriately 
cued; and 12 and older, strategic processors who can use storage and retrieval strategies at 
will. When applied to a central versus incidental learning paradigm, it predicts that 
strategic processors should be able to control the extent of incidental learning to ensure 
greater retention of central content. Cued processors can do likewise if prompted, but 
limited processors cannot control the processing that occurs. This leads to the expectation 
that children aged older than seven should benefit from assistance in terms of processing 
advertising in a more mature manner. 
A significant body of research is devoted to assessing the most effective way to 
improve children's information processing abilities and whether improved information 
processing abilities impact on children's responses to advertising. Various avenues for 
teaching children about advertising and encouraging discriminatory responses include 
parental input, school curriculum, and public service announcements (PSAs), the latter two 
options being the most commonly researched. 
Roberts and associates ( 1980) set out to teach children how to process and evaluate 
commercials in a more "adult" rational way. They worked from the premise that if 
children can be made more aware of the persuasive and selling intent of commercials and 
can be taught to recognise various audio-visual techniques, they will be better able to 
evaluate advertising. The subjects in the treatment group watched one or both of two 
instructional films that were available to the public at that time. They assessed the impact 
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of the films on scales that measured the subjects' general scepticism of commercials, 
knowledge of advertising techniques, and beliefs in claims of specific commercials. They 
concluded that the films were effective in teaching the children to be more critical of 
commercial appeals, and those who were initially most susceptible to commercial appeals 
(younger children and heavy viewers) learned the most. 
Feshbach, Feshbach, and Cohen (1982) sought to enhance both comprehension and 
discrimination of commercials with two training programs: one that was oriented towards 
the purposes or economics of advertising (buyer-seller interface), and one that elaborated 
the motivational aspects of advertising (creation of needs and desires). The results 
indicated that the brief training programs were effective in reducing persuasive effects of 
the commercials on all the dependent measures of children's comprehension, attitudes, and 
to a lesser extent, choice behaviours. Older children showed more resistance to persuasion 
but were similar to younger children on ratings of advertiser credibility. Training younger 
children enabled them to perform at similar levels to the untrained older children. 
Christenson (1982) assessed the PSA approach by creating an extensive three minute 
r.nrnmmP,r information nrocessin2" snot which was inserted in orogramming/commercial - - --- -- --- - - ---- - - - .J. "-' _I._ .I.. "-' "-' 
sequences for the treatment group. He found that relative to unexposed children, six 
through to 12 year olds who viewed the PSA were more aware of the intent of commercials 
and expressed less trust of commercials in general, although the influence on the 
evaluations of specific products were equivocal. 
Wackman, Wartella and Ward (1979) attempted to determine the extent to which 
children under the age of six can be taught to "filter" information in commercials. They 
subjected children to a training program that sought to teach children that commercials are 
designed to persuade people to buy products and also to teach them to look for information 
about products when they watched commercials. The general pattern of results suggested 
that the training program fulfilled its objectives in terms of improving kindergartener' s 
recognition of core product information. However, this improvement in recognition was 
limited to the more concrete information presented in product claims, such as tangible 
product features, while recognition of more abstract kinds of product information (e.g. skill 
level required) did not improve. 
Formation of Attitudes 
Many of the studies done in the 1970s and 1980s concentrated on the children's 
purchase requests as the variable of interest without integrating more intermediate 
7 
attitudinal variables (e.g. Gorn & Goldberg, 1982). The influence of commercial exposure 
on attitude toward the brand (Ab) has been noted by Goldberg and Gorn (1974) who found 
that children who viewed a toy commercial experienced more favourable reactions to the 
toy. Although Macklin (1988) suggested that an attitude towards an advertisement (Aad) 
could be associated with a similar attitude toward the featured product, Phelps and Hoy 
(1996) were the first to empirically assess the nature of the Aad-7Ab-7PI (purchase 
intention) relationship for children. Using 8-12 year old children as subjects, a specific 
focus was given to the impact of brand familiarity and measurement timing while 
controlling for prior brand attitudes. The children's Aad measures significantly affected 
Ab for both familiar and unfamiliar brands, even after controlling for prior brand attitude. 
Interestingly, the children's Aad had a significant although modest impact on their PI 
responses, a result not normally found in studies using adult subjects. This latter finding 
illustrates the importance of treating children as a unique segment when making 
predictions about advertising responses. Similarly, Derbaix and Bree (1997) found a 
significant link between Aad and Ab, for both known and unknown brands. 
Attitude-Behaviour Consistency 
Attitude-behaviour consistency has been conceptualised in different ways. Goldberg 
and Gorn (1974) concluded that there was a consistency between attitude and behaviour in 
that the child subjects were able to form an attitude from a commercial exposure and their 
behaviour - working at an experimental task to obtain the advertised product - reflected this 
attitude. Roedder, Sternthal, and Calder (1983) studied the conditions under which 
children make choices consistent with their prior attitudes after viewing a commercial. 
Attitude-behaviour consistency was defined as when a consumer makes choices based on 
consideration of prior attitudes while inconsistent behaviour is defined as when only the 
most recently elicited (or most salient) attitude is used in the decision. They found that 
older children were generally better than younger children were at making attitude-
consistent choices. However, even young children were capable of forming attitudes from 
information provided in commercials and making attitude-consistent choices, although the 
authors cautioned that this ability can be overtaxed when the choice alternatives are 
similar, numerous, or comparison is too complex. 
8 
Cognition vs. Affect in Models of Persuasion 
Research on children and television advertising has primarily been concerned with 
cognitive aspects of how they process advertising. In part, this emphasis reflects the initial 
effort to answer the major ethical question of whether advertising to children is unfair, 
given that children may not have the experience or the cognitive abilities to evaluate such 
messages. Thus, research was framed in terms of children's lmowledge of advertising- in 
particular whether they understand its persuasive intent - and children's cognitive abilities 
to process advertising. Furthermore, the theories that have been utilised in the research 
have been cognitive in nature, such as Piaget's theory of cognitive development and 
information-processing theory, which are focused on cognitive and behavioural aspects of 
children's development. Looking for reasons behind this cognitive emphasis, one could 
see that it reflects "an almost complete failure to recognise any affective streak in cognitive 
development" (Meadows, 1993, p. 356). 
Wartella (1984) argues strongly that "for far too long research on television 
advertising's influence on children has focused on a rational cognitive-oriented approach 
to studying children's information processing of advertising messages" (p. 181). As an 
example, the cognitive defence stream of research views the knowledge and scepticism 
about advertising that is typical of children over the age of seven as a cognitive defence 
against advertising (Roedder-John, 1999b). That is, armed with knowledge about 
advertising's persuasive intent and scepticism about the truthfulness of advertising's 
claims, these children are often viewed as having the abilities to respond to advertising in a 
mature and informed manner (Roedder-John, 1999b). However, there is mixed evidence 
regarding the extent to which children's general attitudes and beliefs about advertising 
function as cognitive defences against advertising. Early research found moderate links 
between children's knowledge of persuasive intent and their desire for advertised products 
(Robertson and Rossiter, 1974). However, more recent experimental research 
(Christenson, 1982; Ross et al, 1984) found that children's advertising knowledge had little 
or no effect on evaluations of and preferences for advertised products. Likewise, Brucks, 
Armstrong, and Goldberg (1988), using the information processing theory framework 
described by Roedder (1981 ), found that children aged 9/10 did not use advertising 
knowledge as a defence unless a cue designed to activate that knowledge was present. 
Brucks et al (1988) suggest that this knowledge is not retrieved during commercial viewing 
due to information processing limitations: a cognitive based explanation. Pertinent to 
Wartella's (1984) argument, affective-based explanations include: 1) a child's enthusiasm 
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for a product over-rides the cognitive defence (Robertson and Rossiter, 1974); 2) the 
hedonic value of a commercial, its emotional allure, and its ability to resonate with 
powerful motives may be sufficient to overcome any cognitive knowledge/defence 
(Goldberg, 1999). Wartella (1984) identified the need for future research to expand the 
implicit model of persuasion used in past research to incorporate the influence of affective 
factors. Since then, there have been a few isolated studies that have enlarged our 
understanding of affective responses to advertising and their effects on attitudes, which are 
discussed next. 
One of Derbaix and Bree's (1997) goals was to elicit the most significant predictors 
of Aad and Ab, using 7-10 year old children as subjects. Their model of persuasion 
postulated three main predictors of Aad: evaluative judgements of the arguments, 
evaluative judgements of the execution, and affective reactions elicited by the ad. They 
also considered a range of control variables such as prior Ab, children's profiles, and 
involvement (defined as interest in product classes). The results of the study suggested 
that affective reactions do matter in assessing the effectiveness of advertising. Positive 
verbal affective reactions significantly contributed to the explanation of the children's Aad 
and Ab. However, evaluative judgements of the execution - a cognitive antecedent -
dominated positive verbal affective reactions as a predictor of Aad and Ab. For example, 
for Aad for unknown brands, - the variable for which positive verbal affective reactions 
had the greatest explanatory power - verbal affective reactions accounted for only 22% of 
the total explained variance (R2 = .55), the remaining 78% of which was explained by 
evaluative judgements of the execution and evaluative judgements of the arguments. 
Wartella's (1984) concern about the exclusion of affective components does seem 
justified in light of the more recent research discussed above. I agree that this was a flaw 
in early research and one which future research should try to rectify. However, a concern 
of mine is that the cognitive model of persuasion underlying much early and recent 
research is inherently weak. By this I mean that the model of cognitive processing that has 
usually been adopted assumes that the child is always highly motivated to process the 
commercials. Such a child would process advertising messages in a highly elaborate way, 
making active connections between prior knowledge and the information being presented. 
One can see this perspective underlying the cognitive defence stream of research in which 
it has often been assumed that knowledge about advertising techniques and its persuasive 
intent will be accessed and used as a defence against advertising appeals. As discussed 
earlier, this was not always the case. Yet, explanations do not take into account children's 
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motivations to defend against advertising, which would reqmre elaboration of the 
advertising message. Instead, as already mentioned, explanations focus on children's 
limited information processing abilities (Brucks et al, 1988), or emotions overriding 
cognitive defences (Robertson and Rossiter, 1974; Goldberg, 1999). 
Motivation to process the advertising message is a construct that has barely been 
considered with regard to children's responses to advertising. It is a construct of great 
importance in the field of advertising, playing a key role in many theories of persuasion, 
including the widely accepted Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM: Petty and Cacioppo, 
1986). A key variable affecting the motivation to process the advertising message is the 
perceived personal relevance of the message (Petty and Cacipoppo, 1986). In the field of 
advertising, motivation is typically operationalised as product involvement or involvement 
with the advertising message (AMI)-concepts that are usually based on dimensions of 
personal relevance. 
Excluding involvement from conceptualisations of children's processing of 
advertising has effectively blind-sided researchers from possibilities that children might 
process advertising messages differently in different situations and for different products. 
Assuming that children's involvement with an advertising message is always high is 
unrealistic, the child might not always view television viewing as a learning opportunity or 
actively attend to messages or even be interested enough in the product to elaborate 
message claims. Therefore, although concern about affective factors is valid, the implicit 
model of persuasion used in past research needs to be enhanced to incorporate the 
influence of processing motivation on the persuasion process. The next section discusses 
the potential of the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM: Petty and Cacioppo, 1986), to 
provide a richer picture of children's processing of advertising. 
2.2 Towards an Improved Model of Children's 
Processing of Advertising and Persuasion 
The ELM Perspective: Central vs. Peripheral Routes to Persuasion 
The ELM is a general theory of attitude change that addresses differences in the way 
consumers process and respond to persuasive messages (Petty & Cacioppo, 1983; Petty 
and Cacioppo, 1986). It has typically been conceptualised and applied as a cognitive 
model of persuasion in which persuasion follows a hierarchy of cognition -7 affect -7 
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behaviour (Vakratsas & Ambler, 1999). However, the theory itself is more broad, 
allowing for the primary influence of affective factors. As stated by Petty and Cacioppo 
(1986, p. 5): "A person's general evaluations or attitudes can be based on a variety of 
behavioural, affective, and cognitive experiences and are capable of guiding behavioural, 
affective, and cognitive processes". 
A persuasive communication is conceptualised as having two distinct elements: 
central message arguments and peripheral cues. In the context of advertising, central 
message arguments are regarded as bits of information that are relevant to a person's 
subjective determination of the true merits of a product. Thus, central message arguments 
can consist of rational product information or emotional/image-based information, 
depending on the true merits of the product from the perspective of the receiver. 
Peripheral cues are stimuli that can affect attitudes without necessitating processing of the 
central message arguments. Two distinct types of persuasion are identified: the central 
route and the peripheral route to persuasion. Which route is taken depends on the level and 
nature of elaboration of central message arguments that occurs in the processing of a 
nPr•m::isiw~ mP.«s::ii:rP. Hii:rh Pl::ihnr::itinn of c.entrnl mess~HJ"e ::irs:ruments results in the mess::is:re r ..... .._ ......... _~-·- -~------o-· ---o-- -------------- -- -------·- --------o- -·-o·---------- ----- - ---- ---- -------·o· 
being processed via the central route while low elaboration leads to persuasion occurring 
through evaluations of peripheral cues, named the peripheral route. The ELM posits that 
elaboration likelihood is a function of two elements: motivation and the ability to process 
the message. Motivation to process the message is dependent on factors such as 
involvement, personal relevance, and individual needs and arousal levels. Ability depends 
on the receiver's knowledge, intellectual capacity, and opportunity to process the message. 
Ethical Concerns from an ELM Perspective 
The issues and research questions of the past and present can be framed in terms of 
the ELM. This section highlights the implications the ELM has for the ethical debate, that 
is, whether it is unfair to advertise to children. In doing so, it provides a fresh perspective 
of concepts such as cognitive defences and attitude-behaviour inconsistency. 
The main ethical concern associated with advertising to children is that it exploits 
their limited cognitive ability and life experience with _messages that are inherently biased 
and compelling. Critics claim that advertising encourages non-rational and impulsive 
product choices (Armstrong and Brucks, 1988). This postulated "non-rational" aspect of 
children's consumer behaviour seems to be at the heart of the issue. Opponents fear that 
advertising may cause children to desire or buy products that are inappropriate or harmful 
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such as expensive or unneeded toys, and sugared cereals, candy, and junk foods (Goldberg, 
Gorn, and Gibson, 1978). A related issue is that advertising may cause children to want 
products for the wrong reasons. By using premiums, product endorsers, exaggerated 
presentations, and other techniques, advertising may cause children to want products for 
reasons that are peripheral to the main product benefits. 
The ELM has implications for the latter issue in particular. Assuming that central 
message arguments consist of rational/product-based information, then premiums, product 
endorsers, and execution elements are regarded as peripheral cues. Attitude formation that 
occurs as a result of evaluations of peripheral cues is regarded as the peripheral route to 
persuasion. This persuasive route is taken when the receiver is lacking the motivation or 
the ability (or both) to evaluate the true merits of the advertised product. Taking the 
peripheral route can be considered a rational process in that as limited processors of 
information, we should actively select the information to which we will and will not attend 
(Miller, Brickman, and Bohen, 1975; cited by Petty and Cacioppo, 1986). Thus, a child 
with little interest in toy trucks, and therefore little motivation to evaluate the central merits 
of the advertised product, could undertake a rational process by developing an attitude 
toward the product by basing it on simple cues such as catchy music and so on. However, 
although the process of taking the peripheral route could be considered rational, the 
resulting attitude must be considered less rational than if it were based on the true merits of 
the product. Thus, liking a toy tiuck because of a favourable evaluation of the music in the 
advertisement could be considered less rational than liking a toy truck because it had a 
particular feature that made it more fun to play with. I think I could safely assume that 
critics of advertising would prefer children to take the central route to persuasion, which as 
described above, is a rational process of deriving attitudes by evaluating central message 
arguments. By taking the central route to persuasion, the child's attitude formation process 
is rational in that the most relevant information in a commercial is attended to and 
· evaluated, and this information can be compared to other information in memory and an 
attitude grounded in reason can be formed. Such a rational attitude formation process 
should lead to more rational purchase/purchase request behaviour. 
Cognitive defences from an ELM perspective 
The cognitive defence stream of research postulates that if children have an 
awareness of the intent of advertising and knowledge of what makes advertising persuasive 
(e.g. advertising techniques) then they will be less likely to be persuaded. It is possible 
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that some critics would prefer children to not be persuaded by advertising at all, an 
unrealistic goal given that even adults with a sophisticated knowledge of advertising are 
persuaded by advertising. Others would prefer the child to be highly sceptical of 
advertising, discounting and counter-arguing advertising messages. Yet others would 
prefer children to use a softer cognitive defence of advertising, focusing on relevant 
product information and elaborating it in an objective manner. It should be noted that the 
latter two distinctions correspond respectively to relatively biased elaboration and 
relatively objective elaboration as described by Petty and Cacioppo (1986). Regardless of 
the type of elaboration that critics want children to undertake, it seems clear that any 
evaluation of central message arguments is preferable to none at all. A realistic goal would 
be to encourage children to base attitudes on information that is relevant to core product 
benefits rather than extraneous information that does not communicate the true merits of 
products. 
It would seem that the implicit goal of the researchers employing the cognitive 
defence paradigm is to empower children to take the central route to persuasion. Viewing 
the r.oP-nitive rlefonce naradi2-m through the ELM lens_ we see that taking the central route ---- --o-----·- -·------ .L v v ~ u 
to persuasion depends on both the motivation and the ability of the receiver to elaborate 
message arguments. Research concerned with cognitive defence attempts to provide 
children with the ability to take the central route to persuasion. However, the research has 
often assumed that children will always be motivated to take the central route to 
persuasion. It seems unrealistic to assume that giving children a more adult-like 
knowledge of advertising will mean that they always take the central route to persuasion. 
After all, adults with the ability to take the central route to persuasion take the peripheral 
route for motivational reasons. 
The ELM informs us that motivation to process central message arguments is a 
multifaceted construct, dependent on factors such as involvement, personal relevance, and 
individual needs and arousal levels. As discussed earlier, a flaw in the cognitive defence 
stream of research is that it has not considered the role of involvement in children's 
processing of advertising. The ELM suggests that children must possess both ability and 
motivation in order to cognitively defend against advertising. 
Attitude-behaviour consistency from ELM perspective 
The ELM views attitude stability as a function of which persuasive route is taken. 
Attitude change occurring through the central route to persuasion is postulated to be more 
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enduring and more resistant to subsequent change efforts than that formed via the 
peripheral route to persuasion. Additionally, attitudes derived through the central route are 
thought to be more predictive of behaviour. 
Roedder, Sternthal, and Calder (1983) were concerned that young children 
exhibited behaviour inconsistent with attitudes elicited prior to viewing a commercial. 
They postulated that prior attitudes were dominated by attitudes formed from a commercial 
exposure, the most recently elicited attitudes being the basis for behaviour. A possible 
reason for these weakly held attitudes is that they were formed through the peripheral route 
to persuasion. The ELM suggests that children would possess more resistant attitudes if 
they formed attitudes through the central route to persuasion. 
Age-Related Differences in Elaboration 
Petty and Cacioppo (1986) never empirically tested the ELM on children but they 
did give the issue some thought. They postulated a developmental trend in elaboration in 
which as children mature they develop both the motivation and the ability to think about 
the true merits of people, objects, and issues. Specifically, the young child's attitudes are 
likely to be based on affective cues associated with the attitude object. As development 
proceeds, attitudes may begin to be formed on the basis of social attachments, simple 
inferences, and decision rules. At some point, the formation and change of some attitudes 
becomes a very thoughtful process in which issue-relevant information is scrutinised 
carefully and evaluated in terms of existing knowledge and values. It should be noted that 
this developmental trend was developed in a general context, that is, it applies to attitude 
formation in general and not just that pertaining to advertising. One could argue that 
advertising directed at children is a special context in which both the variables of 
motivation and ability can take on a variety of values. On the motivation dimension, 
children may be highly motivated to process certain advertising messages if the advertising 
is interesting, the product is of relevance to them, and/or the consequences of not 
expressing correct opinions (e.g. peer disapproval) are high. Furthermore, one would 
expect that advertising could be pitched at a level the target audience could understand, 
thereby enhancing children's ability to process the message. Thus, in the context of 
advertising, one cannot assume that motivation and ability to think about products is 
lacking in children, even very young children. 
In a conceptual paper, Van Raaij (1986) predicted that cognitive elaboration would 
increase with increasing age, due to cognitive development, differentiation and personal 
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experience with the product. He distinguished four types of cognitive elaboration: pro-
argumentation, contra-argumentation, source derogation, and curious disbelief. Children 
under the age of six were not expected to engage in much cognitive elaboration. Children 
between the ages of six and 12 were expected to exhibit a higher level of cognitive 
elaboration, although not including source derogation. Children over 12 years of age were 
expected to engage in all forms of cognitive elaboration, with more contra-argumentation 
than pro-argumentation. 
Van Raaij (1986) suggested that the level of cognitive elaboration depends on 
product involvement, situational facilitation, and mode of presentation. Regarding 
involvement, Van Raaij believed that although children may be interested in a limited 
range of products, such as toys, candy, soft drinks, audio-video equipment, and sports 
equipment, the level of product involvement for these product classes may be high. Van 
Raaij identified the need for research with children to assess the spontaneous thoughts 
provoked by advertising. He hypothesised more cognitive elaboration with high as 
compared with low product involvement, ample as compared with restricted processing 
time, and increasing age. 
In another conceptual paper, Brucks, Goldberg, and Armstrong (1986), concerned 
with children's cognitive defences, proposed that children's cognitive responses depend on 
a variety of factors: stage of cognitive development; knowledge about products; knowledge 
about advertising; knowledge about how to process biased information; degree of 
involvement; and verbal ability. They then proceeded to speculate the effect of these 
factors on the degree of children's elaboration in response to advertising. The 
propositions, some of which are consistent with those proposed in this thesis, remain to be 
empirically validated. 
To my knowledge, Derbaix and Bree (1997) are the only researchers who have 
empirically tested an ELM inspired model of persuasion to children's processing of 
advertising. They conclude that "persuasion is not strongly mediated by message-related 
thinking but by peripheral mechanisms, here from an affective type" (p. 219). They based 
this conclusion on the finding that evaluative judgements of the execution and positive 
verbal affective reactions seemed instrumental in shaping children's Aad. However, as 
they themselves state, the ELM strictly applies to the formation of Ab - yet direct 
relationships between central/peripheral antecedents and Ab were not assessed. 
Additionally, the results do not mention the relationship between children's interest in the 
product class (the authors' conceptualisation of involvement) and their responses. 
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Postulated explanations for the children's peripheral persuasion were that the children 
possessed deficits in information processing abilities or had different goals when viewing 
commercials. However, the proposed deficits in info1mation processing abilities were not 
described in any detail. Additionally, the children's motivations to conduct central 
processing were not explicitly considered. Although interest in product classes was 
included as a blocking variable, the range of responses was not reported, removing any 
possibility of determining its effects on the persuasive route taken. 
In conclusion, consideration of age differences in elaboration has mainly been 
conceptual. The sole empirical study, conducted by Derbaix and Bree (1997), did not 
adequately apply the ELM to children's processing of advertising as it did not explicitly 
consider motivation and ability to elaborate, variables that are postulated to influence the 
persuasive route taken. Chapter 3 presents the conceptual framework used in this thesis to 
empirically address questions relating to age-related differences in elaboration and 




3.1 Present Study 
The previous discussion demonstrated a need to gain a better understanding of 
children's processing of advertising and the subsequent formation of attitudes. This need 
has been recognised by leading authors in the field. In recent reviews, Roedder-John 
(1999a and 1999b) suggests we need a better understanding of how and when children's 
knowledge and understanding of advertising is utilised as children view, interpret and 
judge commercials. Likewise, Raju and Lonial (1990) saw the need for a clear 
understanding of how and why children process information as they do in order to provide 
a unifying framework to explain children's reactions to various aspects of advertising. 
This thesis is about age-related differences in the processing of advertising and the 
formation of attitudes in children. The attitudes of interest are major constructs in the field 
of advertising, namely, attitude toward the advertisement (Aad), attitude toward the brand 
(Ab), and purchase intention (PI). Children are defined as being aged three through to 16, 
an intentionally broad definition adopted to assess the expected variance across these ages. 
The ELM is applied to three distinct age groups: 3-7 years, 7-11, and 11-16. 
Hypotheses are derived by assessing the motivation and ability of children in each age 
group to elaborate central message arguments. Motivation, operationalised as involvement 
with the advertising message, is assumed to vary naturally between high and low levels. 
The ability variable of concern is children's information processing ability as related to 
cognitive development. Piaget's theory of cognitive development (Piaget, 1953; 1981) and 
information processing theory (Roedder, 1981) give insight into whether children of 
particular ages have the ability to elaborate central message arguments and thereby take the 
central route to persuasion. 
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In broad terms, the research question this paper addresses is: 
What are the age-related differences in children's motivation and ability to take the 
central versus peripheral routes to persuasion? 
In more specific terms, the research questions addressed are: 
What are the age-related differences in the impact of involvement with the 
advertising message on children's processing of advertising, in terms of: 
• Number and type of thoughts produced while viewing? 
• Argument recognition? 
• Formation of Aad, Ab, and PI? 
What are the age-related differences in the effect of enhanced advertising 
knowledge on children's processing of advertising, in terms of: 
• Number and type uf lhoughts produced while viewing? 
• Argument recognition? 
• Formation of Aad, Ab, and PI? 
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Figure I presents a graphical representation of the conceptual framework. 
Children's processing of commercials is measured by thoughts produced during viewing 
and argument recognition. Children's attitude formation is modelled as relationships 
between evaluations of central message arguments/peripheral cues and attitudes toward the 
ad, attitudes toward the brand, and purchase intention. Advertising message involvement 
and age-related information processing ability are postulated to moderate both children's 
processing of commercials and resultant attitude formation. 
Exposure to 
commercial 
Figure 1. Conceptual Framework 
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This thesis adopts the conceptual framework proposed by Roedder-John (1999a) 
for the purposes of studying consumer socialisation. Consumer socialisation has been 
defined as "processes by which young people acquire skills, knowledge, and attitudes 
relevant to their functioning as consumers in the marketplace" (Ward, 1974, p.2: cited by 
Roedder-John, 1999a). This thesis is clearly in the realm of consumer socialisation and 
adopts the proposed conceptual framework accordingly. The conceptual framework 
proposes three stages of consumer socialisation: the perceptual stage (3-7 years), the 
analytical stage (7-11 ), and the reflective stage (11-16). These stages were developed by 
integrating Piaget's theory of cognitive development and information processing theories 
as well as social development theories, and applying an encompassing label to the stages. 
It should be noted that the associated characteristics of any particular stage are 
based on the general tendencies of children in that age group (Roedder-John, 1999a). As 
cognitive development is not a perfectly discreet process, there will be some degree of 
variance in information processing abilities among the children in a particular stage. Thus, 
the stage descriptions are most representative of the children in the middle of the age-range 
and the stages overlap to allow for variation at the ends of the ranges. 
Motivation 
The ELM postulates that whether the central or peripheral route to persuasion is 
taken depends on the motivation (and ability) of the consumer to do so. Involvement is 
one component of motivation and can be with regard to a product, an advertisement, or a 
situation (Zaichkowsky, 1994). A common conceptualisation of involvement is that of 
personal relevance towards a stimulus object (Zaichkowsky, 1994). A consumer will only 
engage in high levels of cognitive processing if the topic is personally relevant (Petty and 
Cacioppo, 1983). The literature is limited regarding children's motivation to think about a 
message. Derbaix and Bree (1997) noted that the concept of involvement had never been 
defined or operationalised for children. 
Brucks, Armstrong, and Goldberg (1986) make an interesting prediction regarding 
the link between personal relevance and elaboration in the case of children. They 
suggested that children might not be motivated to foim a reasoned and veridical opinion 
when an advertised product is personally relevant to them. Drawing from casual 
observation, they suggested that emotional reactions dominate reasoned and veridical 
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thinking when children process advertising of personal relevance. Thus, they hypothesised 
that the ELM does not extend to young children. In contrast to that predicted by the ELM, 
high involvement results in equal or fewer elaborative responses than low involvement, 
due to affective reactions replacing cognitive responses. 
This. thesis challenges Bruck et al's (1986) assumption that children might not be 
motivated to form a reasoned and veridical opinion when a product is personally relevant. 
It has been noted that advertising is valued as a device for social interaction, serving as a 
focus of conversation with peers, a means of belonging and group membership, and a 
vehicle for transferring and conveying meaning in their daily lives (Ritson and Elliott, 
1998: cited by Roedder-John, 1999a). Thus, it seems logical that it is important to children 
to possess defendable opinions about advertising and advertised products, even if it is for 
the purpose of impressing peers. 
It seems intuitive that children have the capacity to be highly involved with certain 
product categories. Evidence of this can be seen in the success of Barbie, the world's top-
selling fashion doll (Guber and Berry, 1993). The opinion of a senior marketer at Mattel is 
that "the doll is the prop on which young girls project their very private dreams" (Guber 
and Berry, 1993, p.69). It seems reasonable to assume that children experience 
comparable ranges in levels of product involvement to adults. 
Regarding advertising message involvement, Derbaix and Bree (1997) thought 
that children, compared with adults, have fewer reasons to view commercials for 
information. However, findings from descriptive studies tend to support the notion that 
children are highly motivated to process commercials for information. Some authors have 
noted that advertising fulfils some special functions in children. Guber and Berry (1993) 
noted that, to children, the function of childhood is deciding what they want to be. 
Children are naturally curious, wanting to know what everyone else does and likes in order 
to make their own choices easier. Kids bring that curiosity to advertising to find out 
what's new, to be entertained, and to find out what other kids are doing. Accordingly, they 
like commercials and may attend to them as much as programs. This evidence gives the 
impression that children have the capacity to be highly involved with advertising, 
processing the advertisement for information as well as entertainment. 
Thus, motivation to elaborate message content seems to exist in children. This 
motivation seems to be a function of advertising and product involvement, as well as a 
need for cognition. One would expect individual differences in children on these variables 
but the preceding discussion highlights that motivation to process commercial messages 
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may exist in some children. Past research has tended to attribute a lack of motivation to 
the finding that children take the peripheral route (e.g. Derbaix and Bree, 1997). The 
above evidence suggests that this may not be a valid explanation as children may have 
similar motivation levels as adults. The discussion now turns to ability, the other aspect of 
the ELM. 
Information Processing Ability 
Having the motivation to think about a persuasive message is not enough to ensure 
that the central route is followed (Petty and Cacioppo, 1983). A person must also have the 
ability to think about the central message information that is presented. A number of 
variables can affect a person's ability to think about a message. These include distracting 
stimuli, type of medium, repetition, message complexity, and prior knowledge (Petty and 
Cacioppo, 1983). A variable that has received limited attention in the ELM literature is a 
person's information processing ability as related to cognitive development. This is 
possibly due to all but Derbaix and Bree (1997) using adults as subjects. This thesis 
provides a detailed discussion of the information processing ahilities of children to inform 
the ability aspect of the ELM. 
Cognitive development theory has been the basis for many studies in the area of 
communication process effects. In fact, it has been claimed that Piaget's theory of 
cognitive development (Piaget, 1953; 1981) has been the most influential in this research 
area (Raju and Lonial, 1990). The theory posits that at different developmental stages, 
children select, evaluate, and use information in particular ways. Piaget proposed four 
stages of cognitive development: the sensorimotor stage (0-2 years); the preoperations 
stage (2-7); the concrete operations stage (7-11); and the formal operations stage (11 and 
older). Each of these stages is characterised by particular cognitive structures. Critical 
dimensions include perceptual boundedness: the extent to which a child organises his/her 
conceptual skills to mediate incoming stimuli; and centration: the extent to which a child 
focuses on a limited amount of information. A brief overview of these stages is shown in 
Appendix 1. 
Although Piagetan cognitive development theory has been widely used, some 
researchers have proposed alternative frameworks to explain age-related differences in 
children's reactions to advertising. A limitation with Piaget's theory is that his cognitive 
structures indicate limits on children's ability to process information, but they do not 
explain how or why children process information within these limits (Roedder, 1981). 
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Information processing theory has emerged with the function of extending Piaget's theory 
by providing a higher level of mechanistic detail (Roedder, 1981). This theory interprets 
differences in children's reactions to television advertising in terms of cognitive abilities to 
use storage and retrieval strategies. Three types of processors can be identified: strategic 
(13 years and older); cued (8-12); and limited (under 8 years). The characteristics of the 
three types of processors are overviewed in Appendix 1. In the development of 
hypotheses, both Piaget's theory and information processing theory are utilised, serving to 
illuminate the differences between these theories. However, when these theories conflict, 
the actual hypotheses are based on information processing theory rather than Piaget's 
theory, due to information processing theory being grounded in a higher level of 
mechanistic detail (Roedder, 1981). 
Perceptual Stage (3-7 years) 
Piagetian theory classifies children in this age group as preoperational (Piaget, 1953; 
1981). The behaviour of children in this age group is described as being closely linked to 
perception. The child's thoughts about objects are poorly organised. 
processing of stimuli, only the dominant features are used to make judgements. Due to 
being highly perceptually bounded the preoperational child tends to focus on that which is 
immediately perceivable rather than that which would require a greater depth of processing 
and more abstract thought. In an advertisement, peripheral cues such as music, action, and 
the attractiveness of the source are more perceptually dominant than the central message 
arguments. Elaborating central message arguments is done at a more conceptual level 
whereas processing peripheral cues can be achieved at a perceptual level. Thus, children in 
this age group would be likely to focus on the peripheral cues to the detriment of the 
central message arguments. Additionally, children in this age group possess limited ability 
to focus on several dimensions at once. Due to centration, children in this age group are 
unable to process central message arguments if their attentions are focused on peripheral 
elements. These arguments suggest that children aged 3-7 years form attitudes through the 
peripheral route to persuasion. 
Applying the information processing framework to children of this age yields a 
comparable proposition, albeit from different arguments. From this perspective, children 
aged 3-7 years are limited processors who possess mediational deficiencies (Roedder, 
1981 ). This implies that these children cannot use storage and retrieval strategies to 
enhance learning. Information processing theory suggests that limited processors are not 
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able to control the processing that occurs. Limited processors are predicted to be unable to 
actively select, store, and retrieve information that is central to the task at hand. This 
proposition has been supported by a number of studies that found that limited processors 
learned less central information than did strategic processors (cited by Roedder, 1981: 
Christie & Schumacher, 1975; Collins, 1970; Collins, 1979; Diechmann, Speltz, & 
Kausler, 1971; Hale, Miller, & Stevenson, 1968; Siegel & Stevenson, 1966). This 
outcome was attributed to limited processors allocating a disproportionate amount of their 
cognitive resources to processing incidental information. Information processing theory 
predicts that aided learning is of little value to limited processors who do not take full 
advantage of prompts to learn (Roedder, 1981). Instead, they process a large amount of 
incidental material along with central material. 
In the context of processing commercials, the above results suggest that children 
aged 3-7 do not have the ability to select and elaborate central message arguments, which 
is a requirement if the central route is to be taken. They have no attention strategy, 
presumably focusing on that which is most perceptually salient. Assuming that peripheral 
cues are more nercentuallv salient and reauire less effort to orocess than central message 
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arguments, it is likely that children aged 3-7 allocate a greater amount of their processing 
effort to peripheral cues than central message arguments. These arguments suggest that 
children aged 3-7 do not possess the ability to take the central route to persuasion, nor can 
they be aided to do so. Both information processing theory and Piaget's theory of 
cognitive development suggest that children aged 3-7 will form attitudes through the 
peripheral route to persuasion. 
Proposition2 1 
Children aged 3-7 do not have the ability to take the central route to persuasion, and 
therefore will take the peripheral route irrespective of motivation to elaborate central 
message arguments. 
2 Labelled a proposition rather than a hypothesis because it was not empirically tested in this thesis 
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Analytical stage (7-11) 
In Piagetian terms, 7-11 year old children are referred to as concrete operational 
children (Piaget, 1953; 1981). These children are developing logical thinking skills. They 
can think conceptually and organise (concrete) ideas well. Concrete operational children 
are less perceptually bounded than preoperational children. As a result of cognitive 
growth, they are more able to organise their conceptual skills to mediate incoming stimuli, 
rather than simply responding to what they perceive (Ward, Wackman, and Wartella, 
1977). Additionally, they are able to focus on several dimensions at once. These 
arguments tend to support the notion that children aged 7-11 have the ability to process the 
central message arguments of an advertisement. 
However, the following discussion illustrates conflicting notions from information 
processing theory. In information processing terms, 7-11 year old children are labelled 
cued processors. They exhibit production deficits in that they are able to use storage and 
retrieval strategies only if aided. Therefore, if unaided, cued processors are expected to 
have similar information processing abilities to limited processors. Cued processors are 
the task at hand. This proposition has been supported by a number of studies that found 
that cued processors learned less central information than did strategic processors (cited by 
Roedder, 1981: Christie and Schumacher, 1975; Collins, 1970; Collins, 1979; Diechmann, 
Speltz, and Kausler, 1971; Hale, Miller, and Stevenson, 1968; Siegel and Stevenson, 
1966). This outcome was attributed to cued processors allocating a disproportionate 
amount of their cognitive resources to processing incidental information. 
In the context of processing commercials, the above results suggest that unaided 
children aged 7-11 do not have the ability to select and elaborate central message 
arguments, which is a requirement if the central route is to be taken. They have no 
attention strategy, presumably focusing on that which is most perceptually salient. 
Assuming that peripheral cues are more perceptually salient and require less effort to 
process than central message arguments, it is likely that unaided children aged 7-11 
allocate a greater amount of their processing effort to peripheral cues than central message 
arguments. These arguments suggest that unaided children aged 7-11 do not possess the 
ability to take the central route to persuasion, which contradicts the proposition derived 
from Piaget's theory of cognitive development. 
However, information processing theory suggests that children aged 7-11 would be 
able to process central message arguments if they were assisted in an appropriate way. 
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Assistance could involve identifying what central information constitutes and 
communicating that it should be focused on. Hagan (1967) found that when learning was 
aided, central learning increased with age, whereas incidental learning remained constant 
across age ranges (cited by Roedder, 1981). In particular, cued processors selectively 
processed more central information to the detriment of incidental learning. These results 
have been widely supported (e.g. Drucker and Hagen, 1969; Hale and Alderman, 1978: 
cited by Roedder, 1981). Aided learning allows cued processors to access latent 
information processing abilities that increase processing of central information to the 
detriment of peripheral information. 
Thus, if assisted, children aged 7-11 should have the ability to take the central route 
to persuasion. Which route they take will depend on their motivation to elaborate central 
message arguments. The above discussion leads to Hypothesis lA and Hypothesis lB 
below. 
Hypothesis 1 
A) Children aged 7-11 do not have the ability to take the central route to persuasion 
unless assisted. Therefore, (unassisted) children aged 7-11 will take the 
peripheral route to persuasion irrespective of motivation to take the central route. 
B) However, children aged 7-11 who are assisted will take the central route to 
persuasion when so motivated, while those lacking such motivation will take the 
peripheral route to persuasion. 
Reflective Stage ( 11-16) 
Piagetian theory labels children aged 11-16 as formal operational. These children 
are developing adult-like cognitive abilities that are predicted to be fully developed by age 
16. These children are developing the ability to think abstractly. Of interest to this paper 
is the developing ability to use all aspects of a stimulus to make judgements, as well as the 
use of reason and logic. These children are becoming less perceptually bound and less 
prone to centration. These arguments suggest that children of this age have the ability to 
take either the peripheral or the central route at will. Thus, the route taken will depend on 
the motivation to elaborate. 
27 
Information processing theory suggests a similar proposition. These children are 
labelled strategic processors (particularly those 13 and older). They have the ability to use 
storage and retrieval strategies at will. They can suppress the learning of incidental 
information to ensure the learning of central information (cited by Roedder, 1981: Collins, 
1970). Strategic processors are not expected to benefit significantly from aided learning 
because they spontaneously use the strategies motivated by prompts (Roedder, 1981). 
Thus, children aged 11-16 have the ability to take the central route to persuasion and 
assistance is not expected to enhance their abilities to do so. Whether the central or the 
peripheral route is taken will depend on the motivation of the children to elaborate central 
message arguments. 
Hypothesis 2 
Children aged 11~16 have the ability to take the central route to persuasion 
unassisted. Therefore, irrespective of assistance, they will take the central route when 
motivated to do so, while those lacking such motivation will take the peripheral route. 
Implicit in the above discussion is the postulation that children in the reflective 
stage (11-16) have greater natural ability to take the central route to persuasion than 
children in the analytical stage (7-11), unless the analytical stage children are appropriately 
assisted. Hypotheses 3 and 4 explicitly make this comparison. An added function of 
hypotheses 3 and 4 is that the comparisons are not based on the dichotomous measure of 
which persuasive route the children take, but on the continuous measure of the different 
levels of central versus peripheral processing and attitude formation that the children are 
expected to undertake. 
Hypothesis 3 
Children aged 11-16 have greater natural (unassisted) ability to take the central 
route to persuasion than children aged 7-11. Therefore, when motivated to take the 
central route, children aged 11-16 will conduct processing and attitude formation more 




Children aged 7-11 who are assisted will have ability equivalent to the children 
aged 11-16 (who will not benefit from assistance) to take the central route to persuasion. 
Therefore, when motivated to take the central route, children aged 7-11 who are assisted 
will conduct processing and attitude formation in a manner as representative of the 




4.1 Experimental Design 
A 2 x 2 x 2 between subjects factorial experimental design was used, manipulating 
involvement with the ad (high/low) and assistance (assisted/not assisted) for children from 
two age groups (7-11, and 11-16)3 that have specified information processing abilities. 
Thus, involvement with the ad and assistance are specified as treatment factors while age 
related information-processing ability is a blocking variable. Thus, four experimental 
conditions were created for each age group, younger (Y) and older (0): (1) assisted/high 
involvement with ad (AS/HV); (2) assisted/low involvement with ad (AS/L V); (3) 
unassisted/high involvement with ad (UAS/HV); (4) unassisted/low involvement with ad 
(UAS/LV). 
Procedure and Participants 
Two pre-testing phases were conducted before the main experiment. The first phase 
consisted of 10 one-on-one interviews with children in the 7-13 years age range. These 
participants were gained from a mail-drop in an area average in socio-economic terms. 
The one-hour sessions were conducted in the participants' homes, with parental 
supervision. The aim of this first pre-test phase was to assess the suitability of stimulus 
material such as various educational programs and commercials. Additionally, the 
interview style of the sessions enabled discussion of the research instruments and 
subsequent adjustment of confusing language and questions. The children were debriefed 
and given a small monetary reward of $10 for their time and effort. 
The second-phase of the pretesting was a small-scale version of the main experiment. 
It was conducted at a single full-primary school, with two year 6 classes and two year 8 
classes-93 children in total. The aim of this phase was to practise and assess the 
experimental procedure, and again check the suitability of the stimulus material and the 
research instruments. Discussions with the children and their teachers were very valuable 
3 The youngest age group (3-7) was excluded from the empirical study due to methodological difficulty in 
designing an experiment suitable for such a wide range of ages and cognitive ability. 
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for fine-tuning the instruments. The children were debriefed and were each given a 
healthy snack as an appreciative gesture. 
The main experiment consisted of eight experimental sessions conducted over the 
period of a week. A total of 207 children (47 percent female) were recruited from a single 
full-primary school (not the pre-test school) for the main experiment. The children 
recruited for the 7 - 11 age group were mainly aged 8 and 9 (96 percent) while those 
recruited for the 11 - 16 age group were mainly aged 11 and 12 (92 percent). The full-
primary school used as a source for the subjects is thought to contain students from a broad 
range of socio-economic backgrounds. In aggregate, it is a fairly average school in terms 
of socio-economic level with an associated decile ranking of seven. The school was 
specifically chosen so that the sample would be representative of similarly aged children in 
the general population in terms of gender, ethnicity, and socio-economic level. 
Eight school classes were each randomly assigned to an experimental condition, 
class sizes ranging from 22 through to 32. The classes were not streamed, so were 
expected to contain a typical range of abilities. Each experimental session lasted one hour 
and was conducted in a classroom made available for this purpose. 
Each experimental session was essentially identical in format, with treatments 
varying as required. The children first viewed a fifteen-minute educational program: a 
video on television advertising was viewed by those in the assisted condition while those in 
the unassisted condition viewed a control video on the topic of plays. After viewing, the 
children were required to complete a short quiz on the information contained in the video 
they watched. Next, the children were instructed to watch a typical segment of television: 
one consisting of approximately seven minutes of programming followed by commercials 
(unspecified number). At this point they were administered either the low or high 
involvement treatment. After viewing the program and (single) commercial they 
completed the main measures section, which assessed the involvement manipulation, 
thoughts while viewing, argument recognition, and attitude formation. Finally, they 
completed a control quiz, which was the one that the groups in the opposing assistance 
treatment had completed earlier. 
The procedure was so designed that groups m opposing treatments experienced 
equivalent processing demands. Pretesting revealed that one hour was a suitable session 
length, not overly taxing either age group in terms of attention demands. Care was taken to 
ensure the children did not guess the real purpose of the study. They were told in general 
terms that I was conducting research on the topic of children and television. At the end of 
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the session they were congratulated for doing well and given a healthy snack as a small 
token of appreciation. 
4.2 Treatments and Stimuli 
Assistance Treatment 
The assistance treatment consisted of two components: a video titled TV Ads 
(Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 1996) designed to boost advertising knowledge, and 
a short quiz on the content that acted as a cue before viewing (see Appendices 2 and 3). 
TV Ads was selected for its fit with predetermined criteria. The goal of the treatment was 
to provide children with the ability to conduct objective elaboration (Petty and Cacioppo, 
1986), which necessitated certain criteria for video selection. First, the tone of the video 
had to be neutral in that it was neither pro-advertising nor anti-advertising (which would 
encourage biased elaboration). Thus, it should not attempt to encourage outright counter-
arguing or outright support-arguing, but rather the ability to objectively evaluate the ad. 
Second, it should not provide strict processing instructions about how to process 
advertising, as that would confound the involvement with the ad treatment. Therefore, it 
should not impose rules such as "you should not allow yourself to get carried away with 
the action", but simply provide information on various techniques that advertisers use to 
persuade such as the use of favourable peripheral cues and the use of well-crafted message 
arguments. TV Ads is a 15-minute video from the Text File series produced by the 
Australian Broadcasting Corporation. It was designed specifically for use in schools for 
children in upper primary/lower secondary classes. It satisfied the criteria completely. 
The second stage of the treatment involved providing an assistance cue before the 
children viewed the advertisement. This cue was to have the function of reminding the 
children of what they had already learned regarding advertising. The cue was in the form 
of an advertising quiz administered just before watching the television segment which 
contained the target commercial. This advertising quiz also functioned as the assistance 
manipulation check. The quiz provided the opportunity for the children to assimilate the 
information they learned from TV Ads and was intended to maintain the salience of the 
knowledge while they viewed the commercial. The cue did not provide explicit processing 
instructions, but specially designed questions within the quiz aimed to exercise the children 
in central route processing. One question required the children to imagine a situation in 
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which they had to learn the benefits of a product. They had to think about a variety of 
peripheral cues and central elements and decide which would be helpful. This later 
corresponded to the involvement manipulation in which the children were instructed to 
learn the benefits of a designated product. It was intended that the quiz question 
previously discussed would act as an implicit processing instruction. An explicit 
processing instruction was avoided because it was thought that it would confound the 
involvement manipulation. Instructing the children to pay attention to only the central 
message arguments would effectively provide them the motivation to take the central route. 
Instead, an implicit processing instruction was given with the intention of allowing the 
children to access any latent information processing abilities should they want to. 
The control treatment given to those in the unassisted condition consisted of 
viewing Plays (Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 1996), a 15-minute video from the 
same series as TV Ads (see Appendix 2). It was a very similar video to TV Ads on 
dimensions of format and complexity, but necessarily on a topic conceptually distinct from 
advertising. 
Involvement with Advertising Message Treatment 
The motivation construct associated with the ELM is conceptualised as advertising 
message involvement (AMI: Laczniak and Muehling, 1993). While several interpretations 
of AMI exist in the advertising literature, this paper adopts the perspective that considers 
AMI to be primarily a personal/situational (message/personal relevance) construct, which 
is consistent with ELM research (Laczniak and Muehling, 1993). 
Thus, AMI was manipulated by attempting to increase or decrease the personal 
relevance of the advertising stimulus itself. A combination of the Learn and Decide 
manipulation instructions reviewed by Laczniak and Muehling was used (1993). The 
commercial that the children saw was a peanut butter commercial. The children designated 
for the high involvement condition were told: 
While you are watching TV this time, I want you to imagine that you are going to buy 
some peanut butter straight after class. It doesn't matter whether you like peanut butter or 
not. Just pretend that you are going to the supermarket after class and are going to buy 
some peanut butter. There will be lots of different brands on the shelf and you have to 
choose the one you most like. When you see the commercials come on, remember that you 
need to buy some peanut butter and that you want to find out about the different brands 
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that are out there. Remember that you want to learn the benefits that each brand of peanut 
butter has to offer. You only need to find out about peanut butter and nothing else. 
The children designated for the low involvement condition were told: 
While you are watching TV this time, I want you to imagine that you are going to buy 
some orange juice straight after class. It doesn't matter whether you like orange juice or 
not. Just pretend that you are going to the supermarket after class and are going to buy 
some orange juice. There will be lots of different brands on the shelf and you have to 
choose the one you most like. When you see the commercials come on, remember that you 
need to buy some orange juice and that you want to find out about the different brands that 
are out there. Remember that you want to learn the benefits that each brand of orange 
juice has to offer. You only need to find out about orange juice and nothing else. 
This manipulation relies on the rationale that the children in the high AMI condition 
should process the peanut butter commercial as though it were personally relevant to them 
while the low AMI children should process it as though it were not personally relevant to 
them. Of course, the children were not told there would be only one commercial following 
the program. There were only told that there would be a program followed by 
commercials (unspecified number) so that the children in the low involvement condition 
would not be surprised at a peanut butter commercial appearing and would be expecting 
orange juice commercials to follow. 
The Filler Program 
The program that the children viewed before the commercial was chosen for its fit 
with predetermined criteria. The program was intended to enhance external validity by 
approximating a typical segment of television that the children might watch. It had to be 
appropriate and interesting for all the children in the sample so that they would watch it as 
they would normally watch a program of choice. Therefore, it had to non-gender specific 
and appropriate for the younger and the older age group. The program chosen for this 
purpose was an education-type program on African school children and the dangers they 
faced on their walk to school. It was adopted from Animal Planet, a television series 
developed to appeal to a wide range of ages. Pretesting revealed that children found the 
program fun and interesting to watch. 
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The Commercial 
The commercial that the children watched was for Kraft Peanut Butter (see 
Appendix 2). The commercial was chosen because it had only been screened in Australia 
and few (if any) children in the sample would have seen it. This was to avoid the 
confounding influence of wear-out effects such as children recognising the commercial and 
"switching off' or some children possessing greater knowledge from having seen it more 
often. The commercial was also chosen on the basis that it was non-gender specific and 
appropriate to both age groups. Additionally, the type of appeal used was balanced 
between informational and emotional, meaning it contained rational product information 
the children could process if they decided to take the central route. 
4.3 Measurement 
Manipulation Checks 
The involvement with the ad manipulation check was a three item, five point bipolar 
type scale that attempted to assess whether the manipulation was successful in gaining the 
desired levels of the specified AMI construct. Because AMI was operationalised from a 
personal relevance perspective, the manipulation check is designed to assess whether the 
manipulation achieved the expected effect on the perceived personal relevance of the ad. 
The manipulation check was adapted from Laczniak and Muehling (1993): 
When you watched the Kraft Peanut Butter ad, did you watch it ... 
. . . as if you wanted to learn about Kraft Peanut Butter? 
... as if you wanted to learn the benefits of Kraft Peanut Butter? 
... as if you wanted to learn what Kraft Peanut Butter had to offer? 
Endpoints: not at all ( 1 )I definitely ( 5) 
The assistance manipulation check was an advertising quiz that assessed knowledge 
of the techniques that advertisers use and knowledge of which components of advertising 
are useful in learning the benefits of the advertised products (see Appendix ?). As 
previously mentioned, this measure also served to provide a description of age-related 
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differences in advertising knowledge. The control (unassisted) subjects were required to 
complete a quiz on plays, which served as a test of the control manipulation. 
Measuring Central vs. Peripheral Routes 
A number of different measures are available to assess the extent of message 
elaboration, including self-reported cognitive effort, argument recall, thought-listing, 
electrophysiological responses, affective reactions, and responses to manipulations of 
argument quality (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986). The latest research testing ELM-type 
frameworks have utilised path analysis to assess whether the central or peripheral route has 
been taken (e.g. Lord, Lee and Sauer, 1995, Derbaix and Bree, 1997). This approach has 
typically involved measuring evaluations of central and peripheral elements and assessing 
how these are related to attitudes toward the ad, attitudes toward the brand, and purchase 
intention. Thus, if evaluations of central message arguments are significantly related to 
attitudes then this is interpreted as evidence that the central route has been taken. One 
criticism of this approach, however, is that it taps outcomes of cognitive processing rather 
than the actual processes and may mask processing subtleties which could be observed 
with the inclusion of cognitions as intervening variables (Lord, Lee and Sauer, 1995). 
For this present study, three main types of measures were used to assess whether 
the central or the peripheral route to persuasion was taken. Path analysis· was used to 
assess the formation of Aad, Ab, and PI using evaluations of central message arguments 
and evaluations of peripheral cues as independent variables. In conjunction, thought listing 
and argument recognition were used to tap the actual cognitive processing undergone and 
unmask processing subtleties. 
Thought-listing 
Cognitive response measures, elicited by thought-listing techniques, are believed to 
be accurate reflections of subjects' cognitive processing of commercials (Wright, 1973; 
Wright 1980, Brucks, Goldberg, and Armstrong, 1986). Cognitive response measures, 
elicited by general probes such as "What thoughts and feelings were going through your 
mind as you watched the commercial?" avoid the potential biasing effect of overly direct 
questions, and provide data directly pertinent to the ongoing processing of information 
(Brucks et al, 1986, p. 651). Brucks, Armstrong, and Goldberg (1988) successfully used 
cognitive response measures with children but cautioned that they may not be suitable for 
children younger than five years due to their limited verbal ability. 
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In this present study, cognitive response measures were obtained by giving the 
children a blank page of paper with a probe written at the top: What were you thinking 
about during the ad? In the space below, write down all the things you were thinking about 
during the ad. In addition, the children were given the verbal explanation that the thoughts 
did not have to be related to the ad, but to write down whatever they were thinking about 
while watching the ad. 
Previous cognitive response research has used a variety of classification schemes to 
categorise thoughts. Cacioppo, Hawkins, and Petty (1981) proposed three dimensions by 
which responses can be differentiated: target, the object at which the response is directed; 
origin, the primary source of the information contained in the response; and polarity, 
whether the response favours or opposes the advocacy. Brucks et al (1988) made the 
categories within the dimensions more specific for the purpose of retaining more 
information about the cognitive responses. 
The classification scheme used in this study borrows from both schemes but is 
adapted to reflect the theoretical orientation of the propositions it will test. Therefore, the 
scheme is designed to illuminate whether the responses are indicative of the central route 
or the peripheral route to persuasion. A critical dimension is target, the object at which the 
response is directed. A distinction is made between central objects - those that are relevant 
to the message arguments, and peripheral objects - those that are irrelevant to the message 
arguments. Other dimensions included are origin of thought and polarity of thought. A 
final dimension combines the classifications and identifies the response as either central or 
peripheral. Definitions and examples of the categories within each dimension are provided 
in Appendix 6. 
Central responses are defined as thoughts of any polarity and of any origin that are 
targeted toward the product, product class, or the message arguments. Peripheral 
responses are defined as thoughts of any polarity and of any origin that are targeted toward 
the executional elements of the ad, the ad communicators, or any other object irrelevant to 
the central message arguments. 
This measure will enable the propositions to be tested in part. For example, the 
total number of central thoughts could be used as a crude indicator of whether the central 
route to persuasion has been taken. A high number of central responses could be 
interpreted as evidence of a high level of elaboration upon objects relevant to the message 
arguments - the central route to persuasion. Similarly, a high number of peripheral 
responses could be interpreted as evidence of the peripheral route being taken. The 
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number of central thoughts in relation to the number of peripheral thoughts will provide a 
measure of the overall central vs. peripheral nature of subjects' responses. 
Argument Recognition 
So that the subject's recognition memory for central message arguments could be 
assessed, subjects were required to respond to a diverse pool of claims, some of which 
actually appeared in the ad and others that were plausible but not appear in the ad. 
Following the procedure originally used by Jacoby and Hoyer (1989: cited by Lord et al, 
1995), subjects responded to each statement using a three-point scale: did appear in ad; did 
not appear in ad; don't know. Correct recognition was coded as +l, incorrect as -1, and 
"don't know" as 0, with the sum of the recognition scale serving as a recognition memory 
index. For the purposes of analysis, high recognition was interpreted as an indication that 
the central route was taken whereas low recognition indicated that the peripheral route was 
followed. 
Path Analyses 
The formations of Aad, Ab, and PI were assessed by performing path analyses 
using AMOS Version 3.62 (Arbuckle, 1997) on the path diagram produced in Figure 2. 
Figure 2 demonstrates the unconstrained model - one that includes all possible non-
recursive relationships. Due to relatively small sample sizes within cells, it was desirable 
to use a backward elimination method of reducing the number of estimated path 
coefficients in order to increase the observations: parameters ratio to desirable levels-5 
observations per estimated parameter, (Hair et al, 1998)-thus increasing the statistical 
power to ascertain significance. Using this procedure for each cell individually, non-
significant paths were eliminated one by one in the order of non-significance until only 
significant relationships remained. Thus, each final model was a constrained version of 
that shown in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2. Path analysis framework 
PC 
The link between path diagram relationships and central and peripheral routes 
Petty and Cacioppo (1981) define the central route as being taken when a subject's 
attitudes are derived from evaluations of message arguments. In contrast, the peripheral 
route is defined as being taken when a subject's attitudes are constructed from evaluations 
of peripheral cues. Strictly speaking, the ELM doesn't allow for concurrent processing of 
central and peripheral cues. As such, in its pure form, the ELM would specify the central 
route as significant paths from ARG to Aad, Ab or PI while not allowing any significant 
paths from PC to Aad, Ab, or PI, the opposite being the case for the peripheral route to 
persuasion. This assumption is relaxed in this study as more recent research has suggested 
the possibility of concurrent processing (Lord et al, 1995; Bohner, Crow, Erb, and 
Schwarz, 1992: cited by Hale et al, 1995). 
Therefore, the central route is defined here as being taken when a subject's attitudes 
are derived predominantly from evaluations of message arguments. Conversely, the 
peripheral route is defined here as being taken when a subject's attitudes are constructed 
predominantly from evaluations of peripheral cues. 
Dependent Measures 
The measures used in this study accounted for the limited cognitive abilities of the 
child subjects. Thus, scales that are typically "7-point scales" were reduced to "5-point 
scales" and the wording was simplified to be easily understood by the youngest subjects. 
Scales that were borrowed from past research have yielded acceptable levels of reliability 
using Cronbach's alpha as an indicator. Reverse scoring was used for some items on every 
scale as a way to ensure that the subjects were answering correctly. Subjects were 
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informed of this and told to carefully read the terms at either end of the scale so that they 
gave their real answers. 
Evaluations of central message arguments 
Similar research using adult subjects typically had subjects evaluate argument 
strength on multiple dimensions using 5-point semantic differential scales including 
persuasive-unpersuasive, informative-uninformative, weak-strong, believable-unbelievable 
(e.g. Lord et al, 1995; Petty, Cacioppo, and Schumann, 1983). The scale used in the 
present study employs similar dimensions but altered wording more suitable for children. 
Subjects were reminded of the claims that appeared in the commercial, which was 
necessary to avoid confounding from the argument recognition task in which they were 
presented with false claims. Subjects then evaluated argument strength on four dimensions 
using 5-point semantic differential scales: don't matter at all/matter very much; do not help 
me understand the product at all/help me understand the product a lot; do not make me 
want the product at all/make me want the product a lot; do not believe them at all/believe 
them a lot. 
Evaluations of peripheral cues 
Consistent with past research (e.g. Lord et al, 1995), subjects evaluated peripheral 
cues on items similar to those used for Aad. Thus, subjects evaluated the peripheral 
elements (music, characters, colours, action) on a 4-item 5-point semantic differential scale 
polarised by the terms: do not like it at all/like it a lot; boring/fun; stupid-great; 
dull/exciting. 
Attitude toward the ad 
Aad is defined here as a predisposition to respond in a favourable or an 
unfavourable way to a particular advertising stimulus at a particular exposure occasion 
(MacKenzie and Lutz, 1989). Aad was elicited using the same scale as Phelps and Hoy, a 
4-item 5-point semantic differential scale polarised by the terms: hate it/like it a lot; 
boring/fun; stupid/great; dull/exciting. 
Attitude toward the brand 
Ab is defined here as a predisposition to respond in a favourable or unfavourable 
way to a particular brand after presentation of an advertising stimulus (Phelps and Hoy, 
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1996). Ab was operationalised as the sum of a six-item, five-point bi-polar scale. The 
scale integrated one especially developed for children by Pecheux and Derbaix (1999) and 
one used by Phelps and Hoy. The items were: it is bad/it is good; not very nice/very nice; I 
do not like it at all/I love it; I think it is useless/I think it is really useful; boring/fun; 
great/stupid. The useless-useful item was adapted from Pecheux and Derbaix (1999) and 
reflects a utilitarian dimension whereas the other items are more hedonic in nature. 
Purchase intention 
As in the study by Phelps and Hoy (1996), purchase intention was conceptualised 
as how likely is it that an individual would purchase a product. For children, purchase 
intention also means how likely it is that they ask someone else, typically parents, to buy 
something for them (Ward, Wackman & Wartella, 1977). This conceptualisation places 
the role of child in the decision process as a decider. This role is important whether the 
child is buying a product for him/her self or asking his/her parents to purchase a particular 
brand. Purchase intention was operationalised as a two item, five point bi-polar scale. The 
first item asked the children: "If your parents asked you what type of peanut butter you 
wanted, how likely is it that you would ask your parents to buy Kraft Peanut Butter?" - not 
at all likely/very likely. The second item asked "If your parents asked you to buy some 
peanut butter, would you buy Kraft Peanut Butter? - never buy/definitely buy. 
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Examination of Data 
Chapter 5 
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
5.1 General Results 
The data was examined for violations of assumptions underpinning the multivariate 
analysis before any of the main analyses were conducted. Data examination began with 
checks for outliers and unaccountable missing values. Only one out of 207 cases contained 
missing data: a participant missed the PI measure, which was on the back page of the 
questionnaire. The data imputation method of mean substitution was used to replace this 
single missing value, the mean being that of PI for the participant's group (Hair et al, 
1998). Testing for violations of multivariate analysis assumptions followed the procedure 
outlined by Hair et al (1998), including tests of normality, homoscedasticity, and linearity. 
Checking for departures from normality involved assessing histograms, normal 
probability plots, and the Kolgomorv-Smirnov (Lilliefors Significance Corrected) statistic 
for each main measure in the thought, argument recognition, and path analyses. These 
were conducted on the aggregate-level, age-level, and the individual group level. In 
general, the histograms, normal probability plots Kolgomorv-Smirnov statistics revealed 
no substantial departures from normality (see Appendix 7 for the data distribution of 
variables used in the path analyses). 
The homoscedasticity of variables used in two-way Anova was assessed using 
Levene's test for equality of variance. Results were mixed, with the younger children's 
responses generally being more homoscedastic than the older children's responses. In 
particular, the younger and the older children's total number of thoughts showed 
significant heteroscedasticity, as did the older children's c-p nieasure. However, these 
measures were not the main measures of interest, number of central thoughts and number 
of peripheral thoughts being the focal point of the analysis and resulting conclusions. 
The homoscedasticity of variables used in path analyses was analysed through 
examination of the residuals (standardised residual vs. standardised predicted). No 
patterns of increasing or decreasing residuals were found, indicating acceptable 
homoscedasticity for all the path analysis variables. 
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Linearity was assessed through both an analysis of residuals and partial regression 
plots. The partial regression plots revealed generally well defined linear relationships 
between the between the independent and dependent variables. Additionally, the residuals 
revealed no identifiable non-linear patterns, indicating that linear models were most 
approporiate. 
The reliabilities of multiple-item scales used in the path analysis were assessed 
using Cronbach's alpha, on aggregate, age-specific and group specific levels. Levels of 
Cronbach's alpha were as desired, generally being above 0.8 (see Appendix 8). 
Manipulation Checks 
Involvement manipulation - involvement with advertising 
Table 3 reports the results of the manipulation check. The aim of the involvement 
manipulation was to separate the sample into groups that were high in advertising 
involvement and groups that were low in advertising involvement. Ideally, the low 
involvement manipulation groups (L V) levels of involvement would be statistically 
similar, below the scale mean of 3, and significantly different from the high involvement 
manipulation groups (HV) levels of involvement, which would be statistically similar and 
above the scale mean of 3. 
Table 1. Mean Involvement Scores 
Group Mean S.D 
-
(Y) AS/HV 3.05 1.11 
(Y) AS/LV 2.47 1.21 
(Y) UAS/HV 2.70 1.08 
(Y) UAS/LV 2.49 1.11 
(0) AS/HV 2.17 .77 
(0) AS/LV 2.45 .77 
(0) UAS/HV 1.75 .68 
(0) UAS/LV 1.60 .86 
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Analysis of the manipulation check results revealed that the involvement 
manipulation did not consistently have the desired effect. In general, the levels of 
involvement could best be classified as low - moderate. The highest value was 3.05, only 
slightly above the scale mean. The rest of the values ranged from 1.60 to 2.70. Thus, 
according to the manipulation check, the aim to achieve values falling either side of the 
scale mean was not attained. 
Analysing the results of the younger groups shows that involvement varied in the 
expected directions, that is, the mean level of involvement for LV was always lower than 
that of HV. However, these values were not always statistically different. T-tests reveal 
that the AS/HV group's value of 3.05 was significantly larger than the AS/LV and 
UAS/LV groups' values of 2.47 and 2.49 respectively (p = .070, p = .050). However, the 
UAS/HV group's level of involvement at 2.70 was not significantly larger than the either 
the AS/LV or UAS/LV groups' values stated above (p = .48, p = .46). The two LV groups 
did report similar levels of involvement (p = .231), as did the two HV groups (p = .956). 
The older children's results fall further from the region of desirability. In general, 
the values for the older children were lower than those for the younger children. The 
AS/HV group's mean level of involvement was significantly higher than the UAS/LV 
group's (p = .021), but was not significantly different to the AS/LV group's. The other 
high involvement group, UAS/HV, had a mean level of involvement that was significantly 
higher than the AS/LV group's (p = .002), but not significantly different to the UAS/LV 
group's level of involvement (p = .497). 
This lack of convergence between the manipulation and the manipulation check can 
be interpreted in different ways (Perdue and Summers, 1986). It might be due to a weak 
manipulation or an unreliable manipulation, or an invalid or unreliable manipulation check 
(or some combination of these factors). The logic of Perdue and Summers (1986) would 
suggest that obtaining non-significant results for the manipulation check does not discredit 
the manipulation if the measures used are of questionable validity. Pretesting revealed that 
the children found the initial manipulation check hard to understand. A revised 
manipulation check was then used in the actual data collection without further pretesting. 
It may be that the children found it hard to understand the manipulation check, thus 
reducing its construct validity. Pretesting also revealed that some of the children 
interpreted the involvement with the advertising message manipulation check as a check of 
involvement with peanut butter-or how much they liked peanut butter. Thus, although (as 
revealed later) the treatment successfully manipulated involvement with the advertising 
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message, the actual manipulation check might be revealing how involved the children were 
with peanut butter-a quite different construct. 
Rather than relying on a potentially invalid manipulation check, an option is to use 
alternative approaches to assess whether the manipulation was successful. One such 
approach is to assess whether the pattern of results are consistent with the broad theory 
underlying the study (Perdue and Summers, 1986). If so, one might claim this as 
demonstrating a degree of nomological validity and thus evidence that the construct 
validity of the manipulation has been provided. Of course, the strength of this claim would 
depend on the absence of plausible rival interpretations other than the manipulation. 
Analysis of the thoughts listed in the thought listing exercise indicates that the 
involvement manipulation did influence the children's processing in the expected manner. 
Amongst the younger children, the low involvement groups reported a greater number of 
peripheral thoughts, consistent with theory. Amongst the older children, the low 
involvement groups had fewer central thoughts and more peripheral thoughts than the high 
involvement groups. Further, amongst the older children, the high involvement groups 
performed better at the argument recognition task. And finally, the results for the attitude 
formation exercise reveal that for the older children, those in the high involvement 
condition formed their attitude toward the brand in a way more typical of the central route, 
a widely reported result from studies performing involvement manipulations (e.g. Petty 
and Cacioppo, 1983; 1986). Given the high level of internal validity striven for in the 
design of the study, it is unlikely that rival explanations exist for these effects. 
In conclusion, analysis of the results provides overwhelming evidence that the 
involvement manipulation did achieve some of its goals. Both younger and older children 
showed some of the expected differentiation in their responses corresponding to the 
involvement manipulation they experienced. Thus, the assumption that underlies the 
analyses and resulting conclusions is that the involvement manipulation did create groups 
that were higher and lower in advertising involvement. However, inherent in rejecting the 
manipulation check is the loss of information regarding the actual levels of involvement 
that the manipulation achieved. 
Assistance manipulation - knowledge of advertising 
The assistance manipulation was intended to split the sample into groups that were 
higher and lower in advertising knowledge. Analysis of the advertising knowledge scores 
between the high assistance and low assistance groups revealed that the manipulation had 
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indeed been successful in all cases. Amongst the younger children, the mean scores for the 
two assisted groups were significantly higher than those of the two unassisted groups (p-
values < .014). An identical pattern of results is found for the older children (p-values < 
.027). 
Table 2. Mean Advertising Knowledge Scores 
Group .Mean S.D 
(Y) AS/HV 11.10 5.17 
(Y) AS!LV 8.88 4.37 
(Y) UAS/HV 5.93 3.15 
(Y) UAS!LV 5.78 4.67 
(0) AS/HV 12.82 6.30 
(0) AS!LV 12.36 5.74 
(0) UAS/HV 8.87 4.33 
(0) UAS!LV 8.08 3.22 
An age effect is also apparent in which the older children achieved higher scores 
for advertising knowledge in six out of eight comparisons of groups in equivalent 
assistance conditions (p-values < .038). The younger children in the AS/HV condition 
scored 11.10, statistically equivalent to the older children's scores of 12.82 in the AS/HV 
condition (p = .280) and 12.36 in the AS!L V condition (p = .405). Thus, although the 
older children generally reported greater advertising knowledge, the younger children 
demonstrated the potential to be assisted to an equivalent level. 
Control manipulation - knowledge of plays 
Although not designed to influence the variables of interest, the control 
manipulation served to create equal processing demands on all subjects in the sample. As 
expected, for both younger and older children, the UAS groups that received the control 
treatment designed to boost plays knowledge (instead of advertising knowledge) scored 
higher on the plays knowledge quiz than the AS group that did not receive the control 
treatment (p -values< .0001). 
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Processing Knowledge 
One component of the advertising knowledge quiz (Q3) assessed the extent to 
which the children knew how to process a commercial for maximum benefit by extracting 
all the relevant information and disregarding the irrelevant. They were asked to imagine a 
hypothetical situation in which they have a desire to get a new toy and they then see a 
commercial for a toy they might be interested in. They were told to pretend that they 
wanted to learn the benefits of the advertised toy. They were given a list of elements that 
the commercial could contain - some which would help them (elements corresponding to 
central message arguments) and some which would not help them learn the benefits of the 
advertised toy (peripheral cues). They were asked to indicate which of the elements they 
thought would help them to evaluate the advertised toy. Potential scores ranged from -7 
through to 7. 
Table 3. Mean Processing Knowledge Scores 
Group 1\tlean S.D 
-
(Y) AS/HV 4.03 2.58 
(Y) AS/LV 4.00 2.77 
(Y) UAS/HV 2.41 2.27 
(Y) UAS/LV 2.13 3.70 
(0) AS/HV 3.82 3.79 
(0) AS/LV ~.09 2.52 
(0) UAS/HV 3.43 2.95 
(0) UAS/LV 3.46 1.82 
Analysis revealed that when assisted, younger children had a level of processing 
knowledge comparable to the older children (p - values > .819). However, when 
unassisted, the younger children scored lower on this portion of the test. All of the 
comparisons demonstrated this pattern although only two out of four were statistically 
valid: the older children in the UAS/LV condition scored higher than the younger children 
in the UAS/LV and the UAS/HV groups (p = .079, p = .068 respectively). 
Amongst the younger children, the assisted consistently scored higher on this 
portion of the test than the unassisted (p - values < .042). Additionally, the two assisted 
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groups scored equally well (p = .965) and the two unassisted groups equally poorly (p = 
.731). 
There were no significant differences between any of the treatment groups for the 
older children (p -values > .336). However, differences were in the expected direction, 
with the assisted children scoring slightly better than the unassisted. 
The result that the younger children's processing knowledge was boosted by the 
assistance manipulation suggests that when unassisted they have less ability to take the 
central route to persuasion. Interestingly, the older children did not benefit from assistance 
even though their scores suggested room for improvement. However, the unassisted older 
children's scores were higher than the unassisted younger children's were, reflecting a 
greater natural ability to take the central route. Encouragingly, when assisted, the younger 
children possessed similar potential to take the central route as the older children. 
Attitude toward Commercials 
This portion of the advertising knowledge quiz (Q7 and Q8) assessed children's 
~~ttitudes toward advertising. This was measured with a two item, four point semantic 
differential scale. One item assessed how much they thought advertising told them about 
advertised products in general, while the other assessed whether they thought TV ads were 
truthful. The mean of the two items served as a scepticism scale, lower values indicating 
greater scepticism. 
Group means were clustered tightly around a grand mean of 2.63, notably above 
the scale midpoint and towards the pro-advertising end of the scale. In general, the older 
children were more sceptical of TV advertising than the younger children were, supporting 
a widely published result (Roedder-John, 1999b). For nine out of sixteen comparisons, the 
older children were more sceptical than their younger counterparts (p -values < .065) For 
the remaining seven comparisons, the younger children were as sceptical as the older were 
(p - values > .239). 
The assistance manipulation was not expected to have a significant impact on 
attitudes toward advertising as it was designed to provide unbiased knowledge about 
advertising and techniques advertisers use. It did not provide information about false 
advertising or techniques that could be considered to be unfair or distort reality. 
As expected, the assistance manipulation had little effect on the younger children's 
scepticism towards TV adve1tising. In four treatment comparisons, only one case 
produced significant differences in scepticism levels. Contrary to expectations, one of the 
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assisted groups had a less sceptical attitude toward TV advertising than one of the 
unassisted groups. 
Likewise, for the older children, the assistance manipulation did not generally 
affect scepticism levels. Again, the one exception is an assisted group reporting less 
sceptical attitudes than an unassisted group. 
Purpose of TV ads 
The children were asked an open-ended question relating to what they thought the 
purpose of TV advertising was. Scores ranged from 0 - 2, 1 indicating a partial 
understanding and 2 indicating a more sophisticated understanding of the purpose of TV 
advertising. 
In eight comparisons, the younger children scored as well as the older children in 
five cases, scored worse in two cases, and in one case achieved a higher score for this 
question. It is interesting to note that the two cases of younger children scoring lower than 
the older children both occmred in the unassisted condition. Conversely, the single case of 
the younger children having a more sophisticated knowledge of the purpose of TV 
advertising occurred in the assisted condition. 
There was evidence of assistance effects amongst the younger children. For three 
out of four cases, the assisted younger children had a better understanding of this concept 
than the unassisted (p -values < .084). The mean for the assisted groups was 1.55 
compared to the unassisted group's mean of 1.18. 
The older children shared similar scores for this question regardless of assistance. 
The grand mean for the groups was 1.52, indicating a reasonably sophisticated-although 
not complete-understanding of the purpose of TV advertising. 
Comparing the grand means reveals that the assistance treatment boosted the 
younger children's knowledge of the purpose of advertising to the same level as the older 
children. However, when unassisted, the younger children had a more basic understanding 
of this concept. 
Knowledge of advertising techniques 
Analysis of this portion of the results revealed that when unassisted, the older 
children possessed a greater knowledge of advertising techniques than the unassisted 
younger children. This was true for three out of four comparisons (p - values < .061). 
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Similarly, when assisted, the older children pe1formed better on this part of the quiz than 
the younger assisted children (p - values< .037). 
The younger children all benefited from the assistance manipulation in terms of 
gaining knowledge about advertising techniques (p -values < .074). Similarly, the older 
children reported significantly greater knowledge of advertising techniques when assisted 
(p - values < .002). 
The older children experienced a mean score gain 3.61 when assisted, larger than 
the younger children's mean score gain of 2.02. Thus, the older children had a greater base 
knowledge of advertising techniques and learned more from the assistance treatment about 
advertising techniques. 
5.2 Thought Analyses 
Total number of thoughts (C + P) 
General age differences 
The mean number of thoughts for each group are shown in Table 6. Comparing 
younger to older children in the AS/HV (1.32 vs. 1.45) and UAS/LV (2.06 vs. 1.73) 
conditions reveals that the younger children had the same number of thoughts as the older 
children (p = .546, p = .200). However, in the AS/LV (l.50 vs. 2.41) and UAS/HV (1.22 
vs. 2.00) conditions the younger children produced significantly fewer thoughts than the 
older (p = .035, p= .001). 
Table 4. Mean number of thoughts for each cell. 
Group Mean S.D 
(Y) AS/HV 1.32 1.05 
(Y) AS/LV 1.50 1.02 
(Y) UAS/HV 1.22 0.51 
(Y) UAS/LV 2.06 1.08 
(0) AS/HV 1.45 0.51 
(0) AS/LV 2.41 1.68 
(0) UAS/HV 2.00 0.90 
(0) UAS/LV 1.73 0.87 
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Younger children 
Two-way ANOV A derives a significant model for total number of thoughts as a 
function of involvement and assistance for the younger children (F3,110 = 4.787, p = .004). 
As can be seen from observing Table 5 and Figure 3a, two-way ANOV A reveals a 
significant main effect for involvement (INV) (Fu 10 = 8.006, p = .005) qualified by a 
marginally significant interaction between involvement and assistance (ASS) (F1,1 10 = 
3.422, p = .067). For children in the low involvement condition, there was a significant 
decrease in the number of thoughts when they were assisted (1.50 vs. 2.06, p = .053). 
However, assistance did not seem to affect the number of thoughts produced for the 
children in the high involvement condition (1.22 vs. 1.32, p = .637). Looking from an 
involvement perspective: children who were unassisted produced a greater number of 
thoughts when they were in the low involvement group (2.06 vs. 1.22, p = .000). 
However, those that were assisted produced a similar number of thoughts regardless of 
which involvement condition they experienced (l.32 vs. 1.50, p = .531). 
Table 5. Effects of involvement and assistance on total number of thoughts 
A:ge-Group--Source- - --F----Sig.--
YOUNGER Model a 4.787 .004 
INV 8.066 .005 
ASS 1.663 .200 
INV* ASS 3.422 .067 
OLDER Model0 3.214 .027 
INV 2.373 .127 
ASS .089 .766 
INV* ASS 7.568 .007 
a R Squared= .115 (Adjusted R Squared= .091) 
b R Squared = .098 (Adjusted R Squared = .067) 
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Older children 
Two-way ANOV A also derives a significant model for total number of thoughts as 
a function of involvement and assistance for the older children (F3,89 = 3.214, p = .027). 
Figure 3b reveals an interaction between involvement and assistance for the older children 
(F1,89 = 7.568, p = .007). This interaction is stronger in effect and of a different nature than 
that experienced by the younger group. Assistance increased the number of thoughts for 
the children in the low involvement group (2.41 vs. 1.73, p = .098) and decreased the 
number of thoughts for those in the high involvement group (1.45 vs. 2.00, p = .017). 
Switching to an involvement perspective reveals that the assisted children produced more 
thoughts in the low involvement condition (2.41 vs. 1.45, p = .017), whilst the unassisted 
children produced a similar number of thoughts in each involvement condition (2.00 vs. 
1.73, p = .296). 
Central vs Peripheral Thoughts 
General age differences 
Checking Table 6 for age differences within equivalent conditions generally reveals 
no significant differences in the number of central and peripheral thoughts, nor the C - P 
index. The one exception is the UAS/HV condition, within which the older children had 
significantly more peripheral thoughts than the younger (1.26 vs .. 67, p = .021). However, 
there could be different mechanisms producing for these seemingly similar results. The 
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analysis now turns to assessing differential involvement and assistance effects between the 
age groups for the three measures (C, P, and C-P). 
Table 6. Number of Central (C) and Peripheral Thoughts (P), and C-P index. 
YOUNGER OLDER 
Group Measure Mean S.D Measure Mean S.D 
AS/HV c .68 .83 c .55 .60 
p .65 .91 p .91 .81 
C-P .03 1.40 C-P -.36 1.33 
AS/LV c .54 1.10 c .73 .88 
p 1.17 1.49 p 1.64 1.14 
C-P -.63 2.14 C-P -.91 1.11 
UAS/HV c .56 .51 c .83 .89 
p .67 .83 p 1.26 .92 
C-P -.11 1.28 C-P -.43 1.56 
UAS/LV c .59 .71 c .35 .49 
p 1.47 1.02 p 1.35 .63 
C-P -.88 1.39 C-P -1.00 .69 
C-Plndex 
The C - P index provides a summary measure of the centrality of the thoughts 
produced during viewing. The rationale behind this measure is that children who produce 
a greater number of central thoughts relative to peripheral thoughts are undertaking 
processing more representative of the central route. A limitation of this measure - being a 
summary measure - is that it masks processing subtleties. For example, a certain treatment 
might have the effect of increasing the number of central and peripheral thoughts in 
equivalent amounts, an important effect that is not highlighted by the C - P index. Thus, 




Two-way ANOV A derives a marginally significant model of C - P as a function of 
involvement and assistance for the younger children (Table 7: F3,110 = 2.265, p = .085). 
The model assigns a significant main effect to involvement (F1,1 10 = 5.856, p = .017), but 
not to assistance (F1,1 10 = .449, p = .504). Figure 4a shows the main effect of involvement: 
the high involvement groups reporting a higher C - P index than the low involvement 
groups. However, T-tests on the differences in the C - P index between the high and low 
involvement groups reveals that the differences are only marginally significant in a 
statistical sense. For children in the assisted condition, the high involvement group's C - P 
value (-.36) is not statistically different from the low involvement group's C - P value 
(.91), using traditional significance levels as a reference (p = .147). Likewise, for those in 
the unassisted condition, the C - P values of the high involvement group (-.43) and the 
low involvement group (-1.00) are not significantly different (p = .120). However, the 
pattern of differences is as expected, with the high involvement groups undergoing 
processing more representative of the central route. 
Table 7. Effects of Involvement and Assistance on C - P index. 
Source Df F Sig. 
YOUNGER Model a 3 2.265 .085 
INV 1 5.856 .017 
ASS 1 .449 .504 
INV* ASS 1 .033 .856 
OLDER Model0 3 1.707 .171 
INV 1 4.941 .029 
ASS 1 .105 .746 
INV* ASS 1 .002 .969 
a R Squared = .058 (Adjusted R Squared = .032) 
b R Squared= .054 (Adjusted R Squared= .023) 
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Figure 4a 
Effects of involvement and assistance 
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For the older children, two-way Anova did not produce a statistically significant model for 
C - Pas a function of involvement and assistance (F3,89 = 1.707, p = .171). However, the 
model produced was similar to the one produced for the younger children in which 
involvement was designated a main effect. Figure 4b shows the consistent pattern - albeit 
statistically insignificant - of the high involvement groups undertaking processing more 
akin to the central route. 
Number of Central Thoughts 
Younger children 
The model that ANOV A derived for the number of central thoughts as a function of 
involvement and assistance is not significant for the younger children (F3,110 = .165, p = 
.920). Thus, the number of thoughts produced by the younger children was not dependent 
on either the level of involvement or assistance. 
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Table 8. Effects of Involvement and Assistance on Number of Central Thoughts 
Older children 
Source df F Sig. 
~------~---~----------------
YOUNGER Model a 3 .165 .920 
INV 1 .104 .748 
ASS 1 .053 .818 
INV* ASS 1 .329 .567 
OLDER Model0 3 2.065 .110 
INV 1 .973 .326 
ASS 1 .111 .740 
INV* ASS 1 4.797 .031 
a R Squared= .004 (Adjusted R Squared= -.023) 
b R Squared= .065 (Adjusted R Squared= .034) 
Anova derived a marginally significant model for the older children (F3,89 = 2.065, 
p = .110). Evident is a significant interaction between involvement and assistance (F1,89 = 
4.797, p = .031) as can be seen in Figure 5. 
Assistance increased the number of central thoughts produced by the children in the 
low involvement condition (.73 vs .35, p = .081), but had no effect on the number of 
central thoughts of those in the high involvement condition (.55 vs .83, p = .222). 
From an involvement perspective, the assisted children produced more central 
thoughts in the low involvement condition compared to the high involvement condition 
(1.64 vs .91, p =.019). However, when they were unassisted, the children in the high 
involvement group produced more central thoughts than the children in the low 
involvement group (.83 vs .35, p =.021). 
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Fig 5. 
Effects of involvement and assistance 
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Two-way ANOV A produced a significant model (Table 9) for the number of 
peripheral thoughts as a function of involvement and assistance for the younger chiidren 
(F3,110 = 4.223, p = .007). The model assigned a significant main effect to involvement 
(F1,1 10 = 10.721, p = .001) but not to assistance (F1,110 = .028, p = .897). 
The main effect for involvement can be seen in Figure 6a in which the low 
involvement group produced more peripheral thoughts than the high involvement group 
when unassisted (1.47 vs .65, p = .001). The pattern was the same for the assisted groups, 
with the low involvement group producing more peripheral thoughts, the difference being 
marginally significant (1.17 vs .65, p = .116). 
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Table 9. Effects of involvement and assistance on number of peripheral thoughts 
Source df F Sig. 
--~----------------~--------
!YOUNGER Model a 3 4.233 .007 
INV I 10.721 .001 
ASS 1 .641 .425 
INV* ASS 1 .482 .489 
OLDER Modelb 3 2.542 .061 
INV 1 4.911 .029 
ASS I .028 .867 
INV* ASS I 3.065 .083 
a R Squared = .103 (Adjusted R Squared= .079) 
b R Squared = .079 (Adjusted R Squared= .048) 
Fig 6a 
Effects of involvement and assistance 
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The model (Table 9, Figure 6b) for the older children was marginally significant 
(F3,89 = 2.542, p = .061). There was no significant main effect for assistance on the number 
of peripheral thoughts (F1,89 = .028, p = .897). Involvement is designated a main effect 
(F1,89 = 4.911, p = .029) but is qualified by a marginally significant involvement*assistance 
interaction (F1,89 = 3.065, p = .083). 
From an assistance perspective the interaction is not significant: for the children in 
the low involvement condition, assistance did not significantly effect the number of 
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peripheral thoughts (1.64 vs 1.35, p = .294), nor did assistance influence number of 
peripheral thoughts for children in the high involvement condition (.91 vs 1.26, p = .180). 
However, viewing the interaction from an involvement perspective reveals that for 
children in the assisted condition, those in the high involvement group produced 
significantly fewer peripheral thoughts than those in the low involvement group (.91 vs. 
1.64, p = .019). Although, for the unassisted children the level of involvement had little 
influence on the number of peripheral thoughts (HV 1.26 vs. LV 1.35, p = .703). 
5.3 Argument Recognition 
Younger Children 
Interestingly, T-tests revealed that there were no significant differences in argument 
recognition (Table 10) between the younger children groups. Thus, neither assistance nor 
involvement seemed to have any impact on argument recognition for the younger children. 
This result is backed up by a two way ANOVA in which no significant model can 
be derived for argument recognition as a function of involvement and assistance (Table 11: 
F1,110 = .148, p = .931). 
Table 10. Argument Recognition Scores 
Group Mean S.D 
(Y) AS/HV 1.81 2.21 
(Y) AS/LV 1.62 1.58 
(Y) UAS/HV 1.81 1.78 
(Y) UAS/LV 1.97 1.94 
(0) AS/HV 3.18 .85 
(0) AS/LV 2.55 1.79 
(0) UAS/HV 3.26 1.05 
(0) UAS/LV 2.31 1.64 
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Table 11. Effects of involvement and assistance on argument recognition 
Source df F Sig. 
----- --- ------------------------
YOUNGER Model a 3 .148 
INV 1 .001 
ASS 1 .238 
INV* ASS 1 .216 
OLDER Model0 3 2.686 
INV 1 7.447 
ASS 1 .074 
INV* ASS 1 .296 
aR Squared= .004 (Adjusted R Squared= -.023) 










As evident in Table 11 and Figure 7, two-way ANOVA reported only a main effect 
involv1ement (F3,89 = 7.447, p ::: .008). For the unassisted children, the high 
involvement group scored significantly higher argument recognition than the low 
involvement group (3.26 vs. 2.31, p = .021). There is also evidence for this effect in the 
assisted condition with the high involvement group scoring higher - although not 
significantly so at traditional significance levels - than the low involvement group (3 .18 vs. 
2.55, p = .143). 
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Younger vs Older 
Comparing the younger children to the older children in equivalent conditions 
reveals that in three out of four cases the older children had significantly higher argument 
recognition scores. The one case in which the younger had similar scores to the older 
children was the unassisted/low involvement condition (1.97 vs 2.31, p = .482). 
Pooling the (statistically similar) argument recognition scores for the younger 
children yields a mean of 1.82 (S.D: 1.89). Given that potential scores could range from -
4 through to 4, a mean argument recognition score of 1.82 is not too distressing. However, 
the older children showed more differentiation in their argument recognition depending on 
the condition to which they were subject. Additionally, their pooled mean argument 
recognition score is 2.81 (S.D: 1.44), significantly higher than the younger children's score 
of 1.82 (p = .000). These results lead provide some evidence that the older children 
conducted processing more representative of the central route. 
5.4 Path Analyses 
General Framework 
The procedure used to derive models for the experimental groups was essentially in 
the tradition of Joreskog (1971: as described by Byrne, 1994). In this tradition, tests for 
invariance begin with a global test of the equality of variance-covatiance structures across 
groups. Rejection of the null hypothesis then argues for the non-equivalence of the groups 
and thus for the subsequent testing of increasingly restrictive hypotheses in order to 
identify the source of variance. 
Model Construction 
In order to conduct a global test of the equality of variance-covatiance structures, 
Model A was constructed, which constrained the entire variance-covariance matrix as 
equal. Testing the null hypothesis of equivalent variance-covariance structures yielded a 
chi-square statistic of 158.226 (df = 105, p = .001). Thus, the null hypothesis of 
equivalence was rejected - there were significant differences between the groups in terms 
of variance and covariance. 
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In order to identify the source of variance, Model B was constructed, which 
constrained only the regression weights to be equal across groups. Variance-covariance 
structures were allowed to differ between groups. The test of the null hypothesis of 
equivalent regression weights across groups yielded a chi square value of 83.889 (df = 63, 
p = .04), which would be rejected at conventional levels of significance. Thus, there were 
significant differences between the groups in terms of regression weights, requiring that 
the final "C" class of models allow regression weights (as well as variance-covariance 
structures) to differ across groups. 
The path diagrams for the final C class models (group specific) are presented in 
Appendix 9. As discussed earlier, final models were obtained by a backward elimination 
procedure in which insignificant paths (p < 0.05, one-tail) were dropped one by one, 
starting with the least significant path and testing significance after each removal. The 
estimated model parameters in the form of unstandardised regression weights for each 
group are presented in Table 12 along with goodness of fit measures. See below for a brief 
discussion of why unstandardised coefficients were used instead of standardised 
coefficients as a basis for comparison. Additionally, the critical ratios for each 
corresponding pair of parameter estimates across groups are presented in Appendix 10. 
These critical ratios have a standard normal distribution under the null hypothesis that the 
difference between two parameter estimates is zero (Arbuckle, 1997). For example, a 
critical ratio of larger than 1.645 (in absolute value) reveals that the estimates are 
significantly different at the .05 level (one-tail), whilst a critical ratio greater than 1.282 
reveals significance at the .10 level (one-tail). 
Unstandardised vs Standardised Coefficients in Path Analysis 
The use of unstandardised coefficients for comparison of causal structures across 
groups was decided on after careful consideration of the long-standing debate in the social 
sciences over the use of standardised coefficients in regression and path analysis (Kirn and 
Ferree, 1981). As described by Kirn and Ferree (1981), a major argument against using 
standardised coefficients in either within-group or across-groups comparison is that 
standardised coefficients are based on variable and group-specific means and variances. 
Thus comparability can be impaired by differing variance structures in either dependent 
and independent variables within groups, or variables of interest across groups (see also 
Achen, 1982). Even if causal importance is defined as the proportion of variance 
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explained, this is dependent on the group-specific variance structure that is irrelevant or 
extraneous to the causal law under consideration (Kim and Ferree, 1981 ). 
In this thesis, the causal importance of a variable is defined as the amount of 
changes in the dependent variable that can be introduced by changes in the causal variable 
(Kim and Ferree, 1981). The unstandardised coefficient reflects this causal law whereas 
the standardised coefficient obscures it (as cited by Kim and Ferree, 1981: Blalock, 1964, 
1967; Cain and Watts, 1970; Duncan, 1975). Some argue that the use of "arbitrary" 
attitude scales necessitates use of standardised coefficients (Kim and Feree, 1981 ). 
However, the key factor is whether the variables are measured using identical scales across 
groups (Kim and Feree, 1981). This latter criterion was met in this study, meaning that 
direct comparisons can be made across groups using unstandardised coefficients (Kim and 
Ferree, 1981). 
General Framework for Analysing Path Analysis Results 
Before attempting to interpret the parameter estimates, tests of model fit are 
assessed for each model using the measures of CMIN, GFI, and AGFI. Then, Table 14 is 
examined for any broad differences between the younger and the older children's variable 
relationships. Next, total effects are presented to enable comparison of the central vs 
peripheral influence to which each group's Aad, Ab, and PI are subject. From total effects, 
an index of Net Central and Peripheral Effects is constructed. This provides a numerical 
measure of the central vs. peripheral influence that a particular group experiences in their 
formation of Aad, Ab, and PI, and allows involvement and assistance effects to be teased 
out. Post-hoc probing of statistical differences between individual paths is achieved by 
assessing the critical ratios for each relevant pair of parameters. This allows the 
identification of whether differences in index values are due to differing levels of 
peripheral influence, central influence, or both. 
Tests of Model Fit 
Table 12 displays the unstandardised regression weights derived from the final 
models for each group. All displayed estimates are significant at the .05 level (one-tail). 
Three measures are used to assess goodness of fit for each model. The CMIN (Chi-square) 
statistic tests the null hypothesis that the model is correctly specified. Due to p-values 
being all greater than 0.7, one can conclude with a high level of confidence that the models 
fit the data well. Similarly, the GFI figures are all very close to 1, indicating a near pe1fect 
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fit with the data. Finally, the AGFI measures, which take into account the degrees of 
freedom available for testing the models, all reveal a pleasing goodness of fit. Thus, one 
can proceed with meaningful interpretation of the parameter estimates. 
Broad differences between the younger and older children 
Examining Table 12, it is difficult to see differences between age groups due to the 
number of variables interacting. However, it is interesting to note that the ARG ~ Aad 
path is only significant for the younger assisted/high involvement group. A larger-scale 
difference is in the relationship between PC and Ab. It is significant for each of the 
younger groups but is not significant for any of the older groups. The Aad ~ Ab link is 
never significant for the younger children but always significant for the older children. An 
unexpected result occurs in that the relationship between PC and PI is negative for the 
older assisted/low involvement group. Another unexpected result is the negative 
relationship between ARG and Ab for the younger assisted/low involvement group. These 
latter two results may reflect an unintended influence from the assistance treatment-as 
discussed later. 
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Table 12. Unstandardised coefficients for significant paths. Blank cells represent 
non-significant paths (p > .OS, one-tail). 
-YOUNGER Asstd/High Inv Asstd/Low Inv Unasstd/High Inv Unasstd/Low Inv 
ARG-7Aad .467b 
PC-7 Aad .751" .727" .873" .1.446" 
ARG-7Ab .584" -.528" .850" .432" 
PC-7 Ab .778" .1.107" .279b .887" 
Aad-7 Ab 
ARG-7PI .583b .614b .545" 
PC -7 PI 
Aad-7 PI .383b .525" 
Ab -7 PI .863" .469b .668" 
- Measures of Fit - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
-
- -- -- - - --- - - - - - -
CMIN .204 (3, p=.977) 1.003 ( 4, p=.909) 2.187 (4, p=.701) 2.172 (4, p=.704) 
GFI .997 .983 .970 .974 
















a p < .01 (one-tail) 





.886 (5, p=.971) 
.983 
.95 
.806" 1.025" 1.113" 
.613" 




.294b .461 a .436b 
1.354 (3, p=.716) 2.618 (5, p=.759) 2.804 (5, p=.730) 
.976 .955 .957 
.879 .866 .871 
65 
Total Effects 
Table 13 presents the total effects as produced by Amos Version 3.62. These are 
defined as the direct effects plus the indirect effects (for a discussion of total effects see 
Fox, 1980). Thus, we can see the relative influence of ARG and PC in the formation of 
Aad, Ab, and PI. To enable easier comparison across groups an index of Net Central and 
Peripheral Total Effects was constructed, providing a numerical measure of the central vs. 
peripheral nature of each groups' formations of Aad, Ab, and PI. Simply, this index was 
constructed by multiplying the (absolute) total effects of ARG by positive 1 and the 
(absolute) total effects of PC by negative 1, and then summing them for Aad, Ab, and PI. 
Thus, index values less than 0 for any variable reveals that a predominantly peripheral 
influence and values greater than 0 indicate a predominantly central influence. Comparing 
index values across groups will facilitate conclusions about whether a particular group 
experienced more central route persuasion than another group in the formation of Aad, Ab, 
and PI. Index values are presented graphically in Figures 8 through to 10. 
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Table 13. Total effects (direct+ indirect effects) 
YOUNGER OLDER 
Group Antecedents/R2 Aad Ab PI Antecedents/R2 Aad Ab Pl 
AS/HV PC .751 .778 .959 PC 1.084 .579 .319 
ARG .467 .584 .683 ARG 0 .453 .250 
Aad * 0 .383 Aad * .534 .294 
Ab * * .863 Ab * * .552 
R2 .461 .623 .559 R2 .732 .713 .223 
AS/LV PC .727 1.107 .381 PC .806 .570 .008 
ARG 0 -.528 .583 ARG 0 0 .584 
Aad * 0 .525 Aad * .708 .709 
Ab * * Ab * * .294 
Rz .303 .468 .408 R2 .701 .359 .522 
UAS/HV PC .873 .279 .131 PC 1.025 .596 .275 
ARG 0 .850 1.013 ARG 0 .613 .283 
Aad * 0 0 Aad * .582 .268 
Ab * * .469 Ab * * .461 
R2 .696 .609 .531 R2 .732 .562 .257 
UAS/LV PC 1.446 .887 .593 PC 1.113 .694 .302 
ARG 0 .432 .834 ARG 0 0 .553 
Aad * 0 0 Aad * .623 .271 
Ab * * .668 Ab * * .436 
R2 .696 .622 .609 R2 .756 .473 .350 
Formation of Aad 
Younger children 
Figure 8 reveals that Aad was formed predominantly from peripheral influence, and 
thus through the peripheral route to persuasic;m, for all groups. However, amongst the 
younger group, there seem to be differing levels of net peripheral influence. These are in 
the expected pattern, with the high involvement group reporting net effects less peripheral 
than those in the low involvement groups-for children in either assistance condition. 
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Assistance had the expected effect of producing net effects less peripheral in nature for 
those in each involvement condition. 
Examining the critical ratios (Appendix 10) for differences between parameters 
reveals that the involvement effect experienced by those in the assisted condition is 
exclusively due to the high involvement group experiencing significantly greater central 
influence (some as opposed to none), as peripheral influence levels were comparable (c.r. = 
0.08, p > .45). For those in the unassisted condition, the involvement effect was due to the 
lower involved group experiencing greater peripheral influence (c.r. = 2.782, p < .01). In 
fact, the unassisted/low involvement group experienced significantly greater peripheral 
influence than any other group-younger or older ( c.r. = 1.556-3.097, p values < .10). The 
observed assistance effect experienced by those in the high involvement condition is solely 
attributable to the assisted group experiencing significantly greater central influence (some 
significant influence as opposed to none). For the low involvement groups, however, the 
assistance effect was due to the unassisted group experiencing significantly higher levels of 
peripheral influence (c.r. = 2.506, p < .01). 
Older children 
Fig 8. Formation of Aad 
Aad: Net central(+) and peripheral(-) 
effects 
AS/HV AS/LV UAS/HV UAS/LV--AS/HV AS/LV UAS/HV UAS/LV 
YOUNGER OLDER 
Examining the results for the older groups reveals a possible interaction between 
assistance and involvement. As expected, those in the unassisted condition reported a 
(slightly) more central Aad formation when highly involved. However, the children who 
experienced the assistance manipulation reported the opposite effect: those in the high 
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involvement group formed Aad through a more peripheral route than those in the low 
involvement group. (This phenomenon recurs at other points in the paper and plausible 
explanations are provided in the discussion section.) 
The small involvement effect in the unassisted condition is not likely to be 
statistically significant as the levels of peripheral influence were not significantly different 
(c.r. = 0.485, p > .30) and no significant central influence was found for either group. The 
unexpected involvement effect in the assisted condition was solely due to the higher 
involved group experiencing significantly greater peripheral persuasion (c.r. = 1.525, p < 
.10). Comparing those in the high involvement condition, there were no significant 
differences in levels of peripheral influence between the assisted and unassisted groups 
(c.r. = 0.308, p > .35). However, in the low involvement condition, the unassisted children 
experienced significantly greater peripheral persuasion (c.r. = 1.803, p < .05). 
Older vs younger 
Comparing older to younger children in equivalent conditions reveals an interesting 
pattern. In three out of four cases the younger children's Aad formation was less 
peripheral than the older children's. In one case the younger children experienced 
significantly less peripheral persuasion ( c.r. = 1.556, p < .10), and in another case they 
experienced both significantly less peripheral persuasion ( c.r. = 1.372, p < .10) as well as 
greater central influence (some significant influence vs. none). This is an unexpected 
result, with previously discussed theory suggesting the converse. 
Formation of Ab 
Younger children 
Figure 9 reveals a consistent pattern of involvement effects for the younger 
children. Regarding the younger children in equivalent assistance conditions, those in the 
high involvement condition reported a more central Ab formation than those in the low 
involvement condition. However, assistance seemed to have the opposite effect to that 
intended by encouraging greater peripheral influence. This is evident in that the assisted 
children reported lower values than the unassisted children in comparable involvement 
conditions. Additionally, the assisted children's persuasion was predominantly peripheral 
whereas the unassisted children in the high involvement condition were predominantly 
influenced by central antecedents and thereby took the central route to persuasion. Thus, 
69 
contrary to expectations, younger children who were unaided revealed the ability to take 
the central route to persuasion, and consistent with ELM theory, they took the central route 
when highly involved with the advertising message. 
Assessing critical ratios (Appendix 10) for differences between parameters reveals 
that the mechanism producing the involvement effect for the assisted children is a 
significantly greater central influence experienced by those in the high involvement group 
(c.r = 3.554, p < .01). In contrast, the involvement effect observed for the unassisted 
children was due to the high involvement group experiencing significantly greater central 
influence and a lesser peripheral influence (c.r = 1.787, p < .05; c.r = 2.543, p < .01 
respectively). 
Older children 
Figure 9. Formation of Ab 
Ab: Net Central(+) and Peripheral(-) 
effects 
AS/HV AS/LV UAS/HV UAS/LV----AS/HV AS/LV UAS/HV UAS/LV 
YOUNGER OLDER 
A similar pattern of results emerges for the older children. Involvement had the 
consistent effect on persuasion of encouraging greater central route persuasion-for both 
those in the assisted and unassisted conditions. Again, assistance had the unintended effect 
of encouraging greater peripheral influence-but this time only for those in the high 
involvement condition. For those older children who were lowly involved with the 
advertising message, assistance reduced the level of peripheral influence. Thus, as 
hypothesised, the older children revealed the natural ability to take the central route to 
persuasion and did so when highly involved with the advertising message. 
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Assessing critical ratios for differences between parameters reveals that the 
involvement effect observed for the older children in the assisted condition was solely due 
to the high involvement group experiencing greater central influence than the low 
involvement group (some significant influence vs. none). Indirect peripheral effects (total 
effects in this case) seem to be roughly equivalent4. For those in the unassisted condition, 
the high involvement group had a more central Ab formation due to experiencing a higher 
level of central influence (some significant influence vs. none) and possibly1 less indirect 
peripheral persuasion. 
Older vs. younger 
Comparing the older and younger children reveals a surprising result. For the more natural 
state of no assistance, the younger children experienced less net peripheral influence than 
the older children in both the low and high involvement conditions. In fact, the younger 
children experienced considerably more central route persuasion in the high involvement 
condition ( c.r. = 1.552, p < .10). Assistance produced rather similar persuasion for both 
age groups, notably more peripheral in nature than that produced in the unassisted 
condition. 
4 In the absence of direct effects, subjective comparisons of total effects (simply indirect effects in these 
cases) are made due to critical ratios for total effect differences being unavailable. 
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Formation of PI 
Younger children 
Figure I 0 reveals a less consistent pattern than that found for the formation of Aad 
and Ab. For the unassisted younger children, high involvement had the effect of 
encouraging net persuasion more akin to the central route. However, even those in the low 
involvement condition formed PI predominantly from central influence, thereby taking the 
central route to persuasion as defined in this paper. Thus, unaided younger children 
demonstrated the ability to take the central route to persuasion in the formation of PI-
contrary to expectations. However, the children in the assisted condition took the 
peripheral route to persuasion when highly involved and took the central route to 
persuasion when less involved-the opposite effect to that expected. 
Further analysis reveals that the involvement effect experienced by the younger 
children in the unassisted condition was most likely due to the high involvement group 
experiencing a greater indirect central influence and a lesser indirect peripheral influence5. 
The involvement effect experienced by those in the assisted condition was most 
likely a result of the high involvement group experiencing a considerably greater indirect 
peripheral influence, which dominated the slightly larger central influence that they also 
reported. 
1 
Figure 10. Formation of PI 









AS/HV AS/LV UAS/HV UAS/LV--AS/HV AS/LV UAS/HV UAS/LV 
YOUNGER OLDER 
5 Critical ratios are not available for indirect effects so subjective comparisons are made instead. 
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Older children 
The older children reported similarly unexpected effects when both unassisted and 
assisted. When unassisted, the higher involved group's PI formation was less central than 
the lower involved group's was, although it was still (marginally) representative of the 
central route to persuasion. Likewise, those in the unassisted condition/high involvement 
condition reported a net influence that was more peripheral in nature, inasmuch that they 
took the peripheral route to persuasion. 
Further analysis reveals that the involvement effect observed for those in the 
assisted condition was due to the high involvement group experiencing greater indirect 
peripheral influence and lesser indirect central influence. The involvement effect reported 
by those in the unassisted condition seems to be mainly due to the low involvement group 
experiencing greater direct central influence (some significant influence vs. none); indirect 
peripheral influence is approximately equivalent. 
Comparing the younger to the older children reveals the by now familiar result of 
the younger children experiencing persuasion more central in nature. Additionally, in the 
more natural state of non-assistance, the younger children were affected by differing 
involvement levels in a manner consistent with the ELM, whereas the older children 





The aim of this section is to provide a deeper and more holistic analysis of the 
results for the purposes of more clearly answering the research questions and testing the 
hypotheses. The hypotheses (reproduced below) make a distinction between processing 
that occurs while viewing, and attitude formation that occurs as a result of that processing. 
Three distinct measures were used to collect data pertinent to testing the hypotheses. As 
stated earlier, the path analyses assessed the formation of Aad, Ab, and PI using 
evaluations of central message arguments and evaluations of peripheral cues as 
independent variables: a measure that has been thought of as tapping the outcomes of 
processing (Lord et al, 1995). Additionally, analyses of argument recognition and thoughts 
produced during viewing assessed the actual cognitive processing undergone and teased 
out processing subtleties. The attitude formation aspect of the hypotheses is assessed using 
the path analyses. The path analyses allow one to specify whether particular groups took 
the central or peripheral route and also to compare groups on their levels of central and 
peripheral influence. Such conclusions are impossible to achieve with the analyses of the 
thoughts and argument recognition. This is because there is no specified level of argument 
recognition, or central/peripheral thought structure that allows one to conclude that the 
central or the peripheral route has been taken. However, the thought analyses and 
argument recognition are useful for the assessment of the actual cognitive processing 
undergone. 
It is important to note that the ELM in its original conception is concerned 
primarily about the persuasive route taken in the formation of attitudes towards the 
object/issue of the persuasive communication. In the context of advertising, the advertised 
brand is the object of the communication, meaning that Ab is the attitude of interest. With 
further development in the area of attitude formation, the ELM has been extended to the 
development of PI, which is an attitude directly related to the advertised brand. 
Furthermore, it has been extended to the formation of Aad, the attitude towards the actual 
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persuasive communication (Lord et al, 1995). So, for the purposes of testing the 
hypotheses, each attitude is deemed relevant and will be considered in turn. 
6.2 Hypothesis Testing 
Hypothesis 1 
A) Children aged 7-11 do not have the ability to take the central route to persuasion 
unless aided. Therefore, unaided children aged 7-11 will take the peripheral route 
to persuasion irrespective of motivation to take the central route. 
B) However, children aged 7-11 who are aided will take the central route to 
persuasion when so motivated, while those lacking such motivation will take the 
peripheral route to persuasion. 
Hypothesis lA is partially supported. Aad was formed through the peripheral 
route to persuasion by the unaided children regardless of involvement with the advertising 
message. However, contrary to expectations, the younger children demonstrated an ability 
to take the central route to persuasion unaided: in the formation of Ab when highly 
involved with the ad, and in the formation of PI when highly and lowly involved with the 
ad. 
Hypothesis lB is only partially supported. As predicted, the aided children in the 
low involvement condition took the peripheral route to persuasion in the formation of Aad 
and Ab. However, the same children took the central route to persuasion for their 
construction of PI. In addition, the aided children who were highly involved unexpectedly 
took the peripheral route to persuasion in their formation of Ab, PI, and Aad. 
Hypothesis 2 
Children aged 11-16 have the ability to take the central route to persuasion 
unaided. Therefore, irrespective of assistance, they will take the central route when 
motivated to do so, while those lacking such motivation will take the peripheral route. 
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Hypothesis 2 is partially supported, with the unaided children in the high 
involvement condition taking the central route to persuasion in the formation of Ab and PI. 
Additionally, the lowly involved children took the peripheral route for the formation of 
Aad and Ab. However, contrary to expectations, PI was formed through the central route 
to persuasion by the children in the low involvement condition. Likewise, Aad was formed 
through the peripheral route to persuasion by those in the high involvement condition. 
Hypothesis 3 
Children aged 11-16 have greater natural (unaided) ability to take the central 
route to persuasion than children aged 7-11. Therefore, when motivated to take the 
central route, children aged 11-16(unaided) will conduct processing and attitude 
fonnation more representative of the central route than children aged 7-ll(unaided) who 
are similarly motivated. 
Hypothesis 3 is only paitly supported. Regarding the processing undergone, the 
(unaided) younger children reported a central/peripheral thought structure equally as 
representative of the central route as the older children's was. This was manifest in 
generally equivalent numbers of central and peripheral thoughts, and C-P index values 
across age groups in equivalent conditions. However, in terms of the total number of 
thoughts produced during viewing, the older children produced significantly more in half 
the cases (equivalent conditions) and were equivalent in the other cases. This could be 
interpreted as the older children possessing more thinking capacity and thereby greater 
latent ability to take the central route. Additionally, the unaided older children 
demonstrated processing more representative of the central route by having better 
argument recognition in both high and low involvement conditions. 
Regarding attitude formation, the unaided older children in the high involvement 
condition formed Aad, Ab, and PI in a manner less representative of the central route 
compared to the younger children. In fact, this occurred for the formation of Ab and PI in 
the low involvement condition as well. However, consistent with expectations, in the low 
involvement condition the older children did experience persuasion more akin to the 
central route than the younger children did. 
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Hypothesis 4 
Children aged 7-11 who are assisted will have ability equivalent to the children 
aged 11-16 (who will not benefit from assistance) to take the central route to persuasion. 
Therefore, when motivated to take the central route, children aged 7-11 who are assisted 
will conduct processing and attitude formation in a manner as representative of the central 
route as those aged 11-16. 
Assessment of Hypothesis 4 is limited due to the assistance manipulation not 
consistently having the desired effect. Apart from sometimes interacting with 
involvement, assistance did not significantly affect the actual processing of the ad-as 
measured by thoughts during viewing and argument recognition. However, assistance 
sometimes had unintended effects on the older children by producing attitude formation 
less representative of the central route. This effect is evident in the formation of Ab and PI 
in which high involvement coupled with assistance yielded attitude formation less central 
than that experienced by the unassisted older children. Likewise, the high-involved 
younger children reported less central attitude formation for Ab and PI when assisted. 
However, assistance did have the desired effect on the younger children's formation of 
Aad, encouraging a more central attitude formation than for any other group-in both high 
and low involvement conditions. Though generally, the younger children did not 
experience the desired benefits from the assistance manipulation. However, as previously 
discussed, the unassisted younger children were as able as the older children were to take 
the central route, possibly negating the need for hypothesis 4. 
6.3 Interesting Findings 
Initial analysis of the number of central and peripheral thoughts, and number of 
central thoughts in relation to the number of peripheral thoughts, indicated that the younger 
children were generally equivalent to the older children in comparable conditions. 
However, deeper analysis reveals that different mechanisms were producing the seemingly 
similar results. The younger children produced an invariable number of central thoughts, 
irrespective of level of involvement or assistance. In contrast, the number of central 
thoughts that the older children produced changed significantly depending on the level of 
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involvement. When unassisted, they produced a greater number of central thoughts when 
highly involved with the commercial, thus demonstrating more control over their central 
processing. However, although seemingly having less control over their central 
processing, the younger children produced a statistically equivalent number of central 
thoughts, which, from an ethical perspective, suggests that they may not be disadvantaged 
or more vulnerable. 
The younger children demonstrated a natural ability to suppress peripheral thoughts 
when trying to learn about the product in the commercial (high involvement condition). In 
contrast, the older children did not report fewer peripheral thoughts in the high 
involvement condition when unassisted. In fact, they had a greater number of peripheral 
thoughts than the equivalent younger children. 
In sum, the number of central thoughts in relation to peripheral thoughts is 
statistically similar for the younger and older children. This suggests that the younger and 
older children possess similar ability to take the central route to persuasion. However, the 
two age groups did process the commercial differently. Higher involvement had the effect 
of producing processing more indicative of the central route for both the younger and the 
older. For the older, it had the effect of increasing the number of central thoughts while 
the number of peripheral thoughts remained constant. In contrast, for the younger children 
higher involvement suppressed the number of peripheral thoughts while the number of 
central thoughts remained constant. 
Argument recognition was static for the younger children, seemingly independent 
of either involvement or level of advertising knowledge. It is interesting that this result 
corresponds with a static number of central thoughts, as discussed previously. These two 
results viewed in light of each other provides strong support that the younger children 
performed rather fixed central processing, having little conscious control over the amount 
or type of central content elaborated upon. The older children generally performed better 
at recognising central message arguments. Additionally, they exhibited more differentiated 
processing, reporting greater argument recognition when more highly involved with the 
commercial. 
The question remains whether the older children performed better at the argument 
recognition task because of higher elaboration of central message arguments or better 
memory processes. Argument recognition was deliberately tested rather than argument 
recall so that the younger children would not be taxed by the task. Thus, it is likely that 
78 
these results indicate that the older children had better abilities to elaborate upon and learn 
central message arguments. 
Deeper analysis of the central thoughts produced during viewing supports this 
finding. Although central thoughts were classified as thoughts about the message 
arguments, product or product class, it could be argued that thoughts about the central 
message arguments represent the purest form of central route persuasion. Pooling the data 
across treatment conditions reveals that none of the younger children's central thoughts 
were about central message arguments. Instead, approximately 85% of their central 
thoughts were directed to the product and the remaining 15% to the wider product class. 
However, thoughts about central message arguments constituted nearly 9% of the older 
children's central thoughts. The remaining central thoughts were divided between 
thoughts about the specific product (59%) and thoughts about the product class (32%). 
Therefore, the older children conducted more elaboration of central message arguments, 
demonstrating a greater ability to take the purest and possibly most cognitively demanding 
central route to persuasion. 
6.4 Ideas 
One of the more puzzling results of this thesis is the partial rejection of hypothesis 
3, which reflected the seemingly theoretically sound view that children in the younger age 
group possess less cognitive ability to elaborate central information and thereby take the 
central route to persuasion. Whilst the older children exhibited greater argument 
recognition and more elaboration of central message arguments, the actual attitude 
formation process did not reflect greater use of the central route to persuasion. In fact, the 
opposite was true, in many cases the younger children's persuasion process was more 
indicative of the central route. Why was this the case? It seems counter-intuitive that the 
older children possessed less cognitive ability to take the central route to persuasion. 
Indeed, it is very unlikely that such cognitive abilities regress over this age range, theory 
grounded in empirical evidence suggests the opposite. 
In order to explain the above discrepancy a distinction must be made between 
elaboration of central message arguments and attitude formation. It is easy to assume a 
high degree of correspondence between the two acts: high levels of elaboration being 
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associated with central route persuasion-but this may not always be the case. A more 
discerning perspective is to view the processed content as providing the information on 
which attitudes can be based. Thus, subjects who conduct concurrent processing of central 
message arguments and peripheral cues (Hale, Lemieux, and Mongeau, 1995), have both 
central and peripheral information on which they can base their attitudes. ELM-type 
conceptualising would suggest that the type of information they base their attitudes on 
would depend on their motivation to take the central route. Thus, high involvement should 
lead to attitudes based on evaluations of central message arguments (the central route). 
An explanation for the older children reporting greater elaboration but less central 
attitude formation than the younger children when highly involved might have something 
to do with the involvement manipulation. The involvement manipulation sought to 
achieve higher and lower levels of involvement with the advertising message. Yet 
involvement with the advertising message might have been confounded with involvement 
with the advertised product. Although the involvement with the ad treatment was designed 
to overcome differences in product involvement, product involvement might have 
dominated the children's responses at certain stages. It could be argued that product 
involvement is the more relevant form of involvement at the (product) attitude formation 
stage. Thus, even if the involvement with the advertising message treatment affected the 
amount of argument elaboration, product involvement might have taken pre-eminence at 
the attitude formation stage. So, if the older children were less involved with peanut 
butter, this may have caused them to use a relatively larger amount of peripheral 
information in their attitude construction. 
Explanations aside, the overall conclusion of the analyses is that whilst the older 
children exhibited greater ability to elaborate central message arguments and thereby 
greater potential ability to take the central route, the younger children exhibited an 






7 .1 Theoretical Implications 
This thesis makes many important contributions to the knowledge base in the 
academic field of Children and Advertising. It tests the most comprehensive model of 
children's cognitive persuasion yet proposed. In particular, it provides the first valid test of 
the ELM framework for children by explicitly assessing the impact of a motivation 
construct - in this case involvement with the advertising message - on the persuasion 
process. Triangulation of measures (thought listing, argument recognition, and attitude 
formation) provides a holistic and detailed description of the children's cognitive 
processing and resulting persuasion. The use of path analysis proved particularly useful 
for specifying whether subjects took the central or peripheral route to persuasion, yet has 
rarely been used for testing ELM-type frameworks (Lord et al, 1995 being a notable 
exception). The Index of Net Central and Peripheral Effects provided a precise numerical 
measure of relative influence of central and peripheral antecedents, and to my knowledge 
is original. 
Motivation to elaborate central message arguments has generally been ignored in 
the children and advertising literature to date, the main emphasis being on their cognitive 
abilities to do so. As a consequence, children have been conceptualised as processing 
advertising in a static manner dependent only on their age-related cognitive abilities. A 
multitude of conclusions have been based on this premise, particularly in the cognitive 
defence stream of research. Thus, it is possible that children's processing of advertising 
has been misrepresented. 
Involvement with the advertising message was found to be an important variable 
with regard to children's persuasion. In general, for both the children in the 7-11 and 11-
16 age groups, higher involvement with the ad had the effect of inducing persuasion more 
representative of the central route, as documented for adult subjects (e.g. Petty and 
Cacioppo, 1983; Petty, Cacioppo, and Schumann, 1983). Thus, future research should take 
a more dynamic perspective of children's processing of advertising by realising the effect 
that involvement has on the persuasion process. 
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This thesis provides qualifications to the Aad-7Ab-7PI relationship for children 
that Phelps and Hoy found in their initial exploration (1996). Phelps and Hoy reported a 
significant relationship between Aad-7Ab for both children aged 8/9 and children aged 
11/12. This thesis found significant relationship between Aad and Ab for the older 
children, mainly aged 11/12, but not for the younger children mainly aged 8/9. Careful 
examination of the results of the Phelps and Hoy study reveals a similar although not as 
significant pattern. In the familiar brands condition, Aad explained 10% of Ab for the 
older children but only 5% for the younger children. Similarly, in the unfamiliar brands 
condition, Aad explained 37% of Ab for the older children but only 13% for the younger 
children. Thus, the link between Aad and Ab seems to strengthen with age. Future 
research could assess if this pattern extends to those younger than seven and older than 12. 
As found by Phelps and Hoy (1996), the relationship between Aad and PI was significant 
in some cases, for both the older and the younger children. This is a result not normally 
found in studies using adult subjects, as reported by Phelps and Hoy (e.g. MacKenzie, 
Lutz, and Belch, 1986; Phelps, 1989; Thorson and Page, 1989). This provides support to 
the suggestion that children should be treated as unique in both research and practice. 
Limitations and Future Research 
This thesis provides an exploratory investigation into the effect of involvement on 
children's processing and persuasion. The general pattern of results revealed that the 
involvement manipulation was successful in splitting the sample into groups higher and 
lower in involvement with the advertising message. However, the absolute levels of 
involvement achieved are not known. As an example, the children in the high involvement 
condition may not have been as highly involved as they potentially could have been. This 
allows the possibility that the children could have experienced more central persuasion 
than they did. 
Motivation was operationalised as involvement with the advertising message rather 
than product involvement as it is more easily manipulated and therefore I could be more 
certain of obtaining the desired range in values. One would expect a high correspondence 
between these two constructs, although this may not always be the case. Operationalising 
motivation as product involvement is possibly more externally valid and would gain a 
more realistic range of values. Thus, further research could assess the effect that different 
involvement manipulations have on ranges of children's motivations to elaborate central 
message arguments. 
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Additionally, the effect of product involvement was not explicitly accounted for in 
this study. The involvement with the ad manipulation was expected to neutralise any 
confounding effects of product involvement. Parts of the manipulation involved 
instructing the children to ignore whether they liked the product and pretend that they 
wanted to learn the benefits of the product of interest (control), an instruction designed to 
simulate high (low) product involvement. 
Although the assistance manipulation did enhance the children's level of 
advertising knowledge, this greater knowledge did not produce the desired effects on the 
variables of interest. In some cases the effects were in the desired direction of enhancing 
central route processing but in other cases the opposite occurred. Post-hoc assessment of 
the assistance manipulation reveals that this occurrence is understandable. The video (TV 
Ads) used in the manipulation was objective in tone and aimed to enhance knowledge of 
all components of advertising - peripheral cues included. It did not provide processing 
instructions, nor indicate that being persuaded by peripheral cues was less rational than 
being persuaded by central message arguments. What seems to have happened is that the 
assistance manipulation actually made the peripheral cues more salient, possibly in 
conjunction with the central message arguments. Thus, although the assistance 
manipulation check revealed that the children gained better processing knowledge from the 
manipulation, this did not always translate into better processing of the commercial. For 
example, the younger children reported rather invariable central processing. The 
hypothesis derived from information processing theory states that these children do not 
have the ability to take the central route unless assisted. Although the assisted younger 
children did not report greater central processing, this may have been due to the assistance 
being too weak or of the wrong type to support such an effect. Although it may have been 
ambitious to expect a 15-minute video to overcome children's information-processing 
deficits, the finding that it sometimes produced desirable effects is encouraging and 
suggests opportunities for more comprehensive programs. Future research could assess 
whether more comprehensive and better-directed assistance can produce enhanced central 
processing in children of all ages. 
The descriptions of cognitive abilities provided by information processing theory 
are predicted to be most typical of the children in the middle of the age ranges. Thus, the 
younger children in the sample, being aged mainly 8/9, should have had the abilities 
predicted for the 7 - 11 age group. However, the 11-16 age group may have been unfairly 
represented as the corresponding children in the sample ranged from age 11 to 13, in the 
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lower bounds of the age range. Children aged 13 - 16 might have demonstrated greater 
abilities and tendencies to take the central route. Indeed, the question remains: at what age 
do children become adult-like in their responses to advertising? Future research could 
adopt a more continuous view of development and assess the advancement of children's 
processing abilities within the currently proposed stages. 
This thesis aimed to develop a more comprehensive model of children's cognitive 
processing of advertising. As such, it excluded the role of affect in the persuasion process, 
which previous research has revealed to be important. Future research should aim to 
incorporate affect into a comprehensive cognitive processing model such as that proposed 
by this thesis. 
Finally, as discussed in the Literature Review, the ELM provides a new perspective 
the concern of attitude durability, which is related to attitude-behaviour consistency. Petty 
and Cacioppo (1986) predict that attitudes formed through the central route are more 
enduring and resistant to change than those formed through the peripheral route to 
persuasion. Whether this applies to children is an important issue that future research 
should address. 
7.2 Managerial Implications 
The purpose of television advertising can be viewed as two-dimensional: to provide 
information about products and persuade consumers to buy those products. The 
mechanisms through which people are persuaded have typically been specified in the 
advertising literature as causal relationships between attitudes such as attitude toward the 
ad, brand, and purchase intention-and actual purchase behaviours. For this reason, 
marketers desire consumers to possess positive attitudes towards their brands, particularly 
attitudes that are strongly held and resist erosion from competing advertising. This is an 
even more pertinent goal for marketers advertising to children as research has suggested 
that children hold relatively fickle attitudes and may act inconsistently with prior attitudes 
in the face of opposition. The ELM suggests that durable attitudes are most likely attained 
through the central route to persuasion. Thus, marketers should be concerned about 
encouraging children to take the central route to persuasion. This thesis provides an 
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indication of how children aged 7 - 13 (16)6 are persuaded and their potential to take the 
central route. 
First, children aged 7 -13 ( 16) displayed the potential to take the central route to 
persuasion, but there were differences within that age band. The 8/9 year olds reported 
limits on the amount of central processing they could undertake, manifest in static 
argument recognition and number of central thoughts. However, they revealed the ability 
to suppress peripheral thoughts when they wanted to learn about the products benefits 
(high involvement with the advertising message). Within the age group, the 11/12 year 
olds reported more flexible central processing, producing more central thoughts and greater 
argument recognition when highly involved compared to when less involved. Compared 
to the younger children, the older children demonstrated greater argument recognition and 
produced a greater number of thoughts about central message arguments. However, in the 
formations of attitudes towards the ad, brand, and purchase intention the younger children 
reported greater central route persuasion than the older children. This result should be 
encouraging for marketers as it reveals that even children as young as seven have the 
potential to take the central route to persuasion. However, marketers cannot assume that 
the older children will take the central route to persuasion, even when highly involved with 
the ad. Neither age-group experienced pure central route persuasion in the formation of 
Aad, Ab, and PI, peripheral influence being reported in all cases. Therefore, advertisers 
should be concerned about increasing central route persuasion for the older as well as the 
younger age groups. 
Advertisers are recommended to make central message arguments as prominent as 
possible, while providing effective peripheral cues that do not detract from the central 
message arguments. Thus, children desiring to learn about product benefits have the 
opportunity to do so, and children with little desire to take the central route can process the 
peripheral cues and be persuaded through peripheral avenues. History reveals that 
advertisers have tended to do the opposite. Children's ads have tended to entertain, usually 
through fast paced action and likeable animated characters (Guber & Berry, 1993). Advice 
from a respected agency is to make the commercial move because children are capable of 
absorbing much more information in 30 seconds than adults can absorb (Kraak and 
Pelletier, 1998). This presents advertisers with a dilemma. On the one hand, advertisers 
want to entertain the child viewers through the use of effective peripheral cues such as 
6 Even though the oldest child in the study was 13, information processing theory regards children aged 13-
16 as having similar information processing abilities. 
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catchy music and involving action so that they attend to and enjoy the ad. On the other 
hand, advertisers want the children to be persuaded by the ad, particularly in a central route 
manner so that enduring attitudes are constrncted. However, extensive elaboration of 
peripheral cues inhibits central route persuasion. Conversely, having few peripheral cues 
might result in the children not even attending to the ad, also inhibiting central route 
persuasion. Thus, an advertiser must walk the fine line between providing too few 
peripheral or allowing peripheral cues to dominate the central message arguments. 
A potential strategy involves the spatial separation of peripheral cues and central 
message arguments. A commercial employing this strategy would initially gain audience 
attention with effective peripheral cues but at a later point allow the central message 
arguments to take pre-eminence. Of course, most advertisers attempt to make the central 
message arguments stand out. But often, central message arguments are presented with 
heavy peripheral support. As discussed above, this may be counterproductive in the case 
of advertising to children. 
Another option available to the marketing community is to educate children about 
advertising. At first thought this may seem counter-intuitive, but not when considered 
from the ELM perspective of attempting to ensure that the central route to persuasion is 
taken. Advertising education of the required type and magnitude could enhance children's 
abilities to take the central route. Such education could involve teaching children to 
analyse the central message arguments contained in advertising should they want to find 
out the real benefits of advertised products. Thus, children who want to learn about the 
product could take the central route to persuasion while those who are less interested in the 
product could take the peripheral route to persuasion. Marketers should realise that 
knowledge about the tools of their trade does not necessarily inhibit persuasion. After all, 
most adults have a reasonable understanding of advertising and are still persuaded. 
For much of this thesis, central message arguments have been viewed as rational 
bits of information, such as tangible product attributes. Of course, this is not always the 
case, and the ELM allows for this by defining central message arguments as bits of 
information that present the trne merits of a product/issue-from the perspective of the 
receiver. The trne merits of a particular product might be emotional in nature and 
advertising should seek to convey this. In this case, the central message arguments might 
consist of moving music or pertinent images that in rational-based advertising would be 
considered as peripheral cues. The ELM framework suggests that marketers should know 
what information dimensions are important for people highly involved with their product 
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category. It has been noted that children are not one market: in terms of needs and wants 
they are three or four segmented markets (Schneider, 1987). Different dimensions of a 
product could be important for different segments of a child market. For example, in the 
case of a toy, a three year old might value the functional attributes while an eight year old 
might be more concerned with the cool image associated with the toy. Thus, a peripheral 
cue for one segment might be a central message argument for another segment. This type 
of variation may be extreme in the children's market, given that children's needs and wants 
change rapidly as they physically and cognitively develop. 
According to McNeal (1998), the future for advertising to children might be in the 
form of socially acceptable and informative advertising that clearly explains product 
benefits. As the range of products targeted towards children continues to expand to 
include more rational (as opposed to emotional) products such as banking services, 
advertisers will become more interested in effectively conveying rational bits of 
information. This thesis details how children aged 7 - 13 (16) process rational central 
message arguments and highlights opportunities for advertisers to increase central route 
persuasion. 
7 .3 Public Policy Implications 
As conceptualised by Roberts and colleagues (1980), the critical question in the 
advertising and children debate is the fairness of the persuasion process given children's 
abilities and limitations in processing and evaluating commercials. Or as the Federal Trade 
Commission (1978) described it: whether or not children process commercials in such a 
way that they are able to comprehend, evaluate, and possibly discount them, as adults are 
presumed to do (cited by Roberts, 1983). The basis of much opposition to advertising 
directed toward children, and indeed, for Sweden's ban of such advertising to children 
under 12, is that children are too nai've to distinguish between advertising and genuine 
programming ("From an advertiser's", 2001; Brabbs, 2000). In my opinion, such a focus 
on children's ability to distinguish advertising from programming is simplistic, and ignores 
many other aspects of children's abilities to process advertising. Additionally, there is 
evidence to suggest that young children can understand the purpose of commercials and 
distinguish them from entertainment. At a recent conference, Dr Brian Young reported 
that his research had found that five to seven-year-olds saw advertising as an information 
87 
provider and promoter of brands, and that three-quarters of eight-year-olds fully 
understood its persuasive nature and commercial process (Brabbs, 2000). This evidence is 
largely ignored by the critics who obviously experience significant emotional conflict 
regarding children and advertising ---children's abilities to distinguish advertising and 
programming being a precarious handhold in an otherwise slippery slope. As Professor 
Furnham (2000) politely puts it: 
The advertising to children debate is alas often marked by over simplification and 
naivety. It becomes a political debate uninformed by the important and relevant 
research and data available. 
This thesis provides a fresh perspective on the debate by applying the ELM to 
children's processing of television advertising. The ELM perspective provides a more 
holistic, and in my opinion more valid assessment of the fairness of advertising to children. 
From the ELM perspective, the desire of critics that children process advertising in an 
evaluative manner translates to the children taking the central route to persuasion. The 
ELM specifies the conditions under which this is likely to happen, namely, when 
motivation and ability to elaborate central message arguments are present. The benefits of 
children taking the central route are postulated to be more rationally grounded attitudes 
that are more enduring - leading to better attitude-behaviour consistency. This thesis 
outlines the theoretical abilities and motivation that children between the ages of 3 and 16 
possess in this matter. Furthermore, it attempts to empirically answer the question of 
whether or not children of varying ages can and do take the central route to persuasion. 
The children in the younger age-group, mainly aged 8/9, demonstrated an ability to 
take the central route to persuasion in the formation of attitude toward the brand and 
purchase intention. Likewise, the children in the older age group, mainly aged 11112, 
revealed such an ability, although their actual processing was more indicative of peripheral 
route persuasion than the younger group. The younger children were unexpectedly 
sophisticated in their processing of advertising, revealing greater ability to evaluate and 
base attitudes on evaluations of central message arguments than theory and past research 
would suggest. The older children were less sophisticated in their ability to take the central 
route than expected, although they did report a reasonable amount of central processing. 
What does this contribute to the debate? That depends on whether one considers the level 
of central processing undertaken and central persuasion experienced by the children 
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undertook to be satisfactory or inadequate. This might well be a subjective judgement, but 
critics should at least gain some encouragement from the finding that children aged as 
young as seven do conduct central processing and do have the ability and tendency to form 
attitudes predominantly from evaluations of central message arguments. Thus, the picture 
of the child as vulnerable and mindless as some critics paint for us appears to be distorted, 
at least in the context of processing television advertising. To the contrary, the findings of 
this thesis indicate that children as young as seven conduct surprisingly sophisticated 
processing and attitude formation, which suggests little basis for an outright ban of 
children's advertising. 
Instead, this thesis provides support for the recommendation that a public policy 
solution should involve both the "child side" of the debate and the "television side" of the 
debate (Armstrong and Brucks, 1988). That is, attempts should be made to enhance 
children's information-processing skills in conjunction with attempts to make television 
advertising more conducive to central route processing. One way of assisting the children 
directly is education about advertising. Children revealed the ability to learn about 
advertising: a well-designed 15-minute video considerably enhanced their knowledge of 
the purpose of advertising, as well as knowledge of specific techniques and how to process 
advertising in a wise fashion (take the central route). As expected, the younger children 
had a less sophisticated understanding of the purpose of television advertising than the 
older children but the educational video boosted this understanding to equivalent levels. 
Furthermore, the attained level of knowledge was reasonably sophisticated, reflecting both 
informational and persuasive dimensions of the purpose of television advertising. This 
indicates that simple educational programs would likely enhance children's knowledge of 
advertising, including the ability to distinguish between programming and advertising, thus 
negating the expounded basis of a complete ban on children's advertising. However, if 
children's ability to critically evaluate advertising messages to the detriment of being 
persuaded by peripheral elements is of importance, then the education must be more 
comprehensive and directed to this purpose than that incorporated in this research. This 
education could be provided via school curriculum or parental coaching in "how to be a 
wise consumer". 
Additionally, advertisers should attempt to make their commercials as conducive as 
possible to central route processing. As discussed in the Managerial Implications section, 
making it easier to process central message arguments might result in more central route 
persuasion, resulting in more enduring attitudes. This might involve making central 
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message arguments more prominent or peripheral cues less dominant. Public policy could 
provide recommendations regarding the use of peripheral cues and the presentation of 
central message arguments. 
The options discussed above seem more valid than a complete ban on advertising 
directed toward children. The formulated basis for such a ban -children's inability to 
distinguish between advertising and programming - is flawed in light of recent (and not so 
recent) empirical evidence. Rather, there is the opportunity to equip children with better 
consumer skills, which would benefit them in other areas of their lives and help protect 
them from other forms of persuasive communication. Additionally, providing advertising 
of better quality provides children access to marketplace information, and allows them to 
critically evaluate the offerings and thereby be persuaded through fairer means. Rather 
than a partial solution less than satisfactory to most of the participants (Armstrong and 
Brncks, 1988), there is the potential for a solution pleasing to all parties - the children, their 
guardians, and those with commercial interests - although it may well require shifts to 
more sophisticated perspectives. 
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Appendix 1. Children's information processing abilities 
Piaget's Theory of Cognitive Development (Piaget, 1953; Ward, 
Wackman, and Wartella, 1977, Raju and Lonial, 1990) 
Stage 
1. Sensorimotor stage (0-2 years): 
• The infants behaviour is not governed by "thought", but by set 
behaviour patterns (schema). 
2. Preoperational stage (2-7): 
• The child's behaviour is still closely linked to perception. 
• Thinking about objects and ideas is poorly organised. 
• Only the dominant features of stimuli are used to make 
Evaluations. 
• Tendency to focus on that which is immediately perceivable. 
• Tendency to focus on a limited amount of information at a 
particular time. 
3. Concrete operations stage (7-11): 
• The child is developing logical thinking skills. 
• The child can think conceptually and organise (concrete) ideas 
well. 
• More able to mediate incoming stimuli. 
• The child can focus on several dimensions at once. 
4. Formal operations stage (11 and older): 
• The child develops the ability to think abstractly. 
• All aspects of a stimulus are used, as are reason and logic. 
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Information Processing Theory (Roedder, 1981) 
Processing type 
1. Limited processors (0-7)1: 
• The child is unable to use storage and retrieval strategies. 
• The child is unable to control amount of processing effort 
dedicated toward processing incidental information. 
2. Cued processors (7-11): 
• The child is able to use storage and retrieval strategies, but only if 
prompted. 
• The child can control the extent of incidental processing, but only 
if cued. 
3. Strategic p:rocessors (11 and older): 
• These have the ability to use storage and retrieval strategies at 
will. 
• They can actively suppress the learning of incidental information 
to ensure learning central information. 
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Appendix 2. Descriptions of Stimuli 
TV Ads 
A description given by the Learning Essentials, the suppliers of the video: 
"For every ad we see, a target audience has been defined and researched in great detail. 
Dialogue, characters, setting, music, colours and words on screen are examined as well as 
the use of repetition, reinforcement, logos and slogans as techniques of persuasion. Our 
presenters create their own ad to illustrate these different features." 
Plays 
A description given by the Learning Essentials, the suppliers of the video: 
"In this age of videos and big budget action movies, one of the oldest forms of artistic 
entertainment still survives - the stage play. In this program we examine the structure of 
the making of the play. Our two presenters enter the theatrical world of "Macbeth" and 
interact with the characters and performance. We look at dialogue, gestures, costume, 
make-up, sets, music and lighting. The program includes interviews with the director and 
two key actors who talk about their stage moves, character development and performance." 
Kraft Peanut Butter commercial 
Action: The basic plot of this commercial is a little girl preparing a peanut butter sandwich. 
As she opens the cupboard she has the choice of Kraft Peanut Butter or another peanut 
butter brought to life by an Elvis character who belts out a persuasive tune. The girl resists 
the charms of the "oily and unhealthy" peanut butter and instead spreads Kraft Peanut 
Butter on her sandwich. The central message argument presented both as words on screen 
and voice-over: Kraft Peanut Butter-never oily, never dry. 
People: Girl aged (9) and peanut butter characters. 
Music: Elvis type rock. Quite prominent and catchy - upbeat and lifting. 
Colours: Bright and cheery blue and yellow supporting product packaging. 
Audio script: 
Peanut Butter Character: Hey you need oil 
Girl: No way, this tastes heaps better 
Peanut Butter Character: But baby it's slick ... (launches into song about greasy peanut 
butter) 
Girl: I like Kraft peanut butter, that's because it's never oily and never dry. 
VO: Kraft peanut butter: never oily, never dry. 
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Appendix 3. Assistance manipulation check and advertising knowledge quiz 
Knowledge of TV Advertising 
1. What is the purpose of TV ads? 
2. What things do TV ads have in them to tell you about the product and make you want 
the product? 
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3. Pretend that you want to get a new toy and you see an ad for a toy. If you want to 
find out how good the toy is, which of the following would help you? 
a. How good looking the people in the ad are 
b. How nice the music is 
c. The slogan for the toy 
d. A famous person in the ad 
e. The words that are spoken in the ad 
f. How much you enjoy the colours in the ad 
g. The words that appear on the screen 
4. If you wanted to find out about the toy, how much of your attention would you have to 
give the ad? 
1 2 3 4 
1-----------------1-----------------1-----------------! 
None A little A lot All 
5. Why do ads have music? 
6. What is a slogan? 
7. How much do TV ads tell you about the advertised products? 
1 2 3 4 
1-----------------1-----------------1-----------------1 
Nothing A little A lot Everything 
8. Do TV ads tell you the truth about the advertised products? 
1 2 3 4 
1-----------------1-----------------1-----------------1 
Never Sometimes Most of the time All the time 
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Appendix 4. Control group quiz 
Knowledge of Plays 
1. What is the purpose of a Play? 
2. A Play uses many different things to help tell a story. Write down as many as you can. 
3. Why is music used in Plays? 
4. Why is make-up used in Plays? 
5. Why do actors use gestures (hand movements)? 
6. What is the "Set" in a Play? 
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Appendix 5. Main measures 
1. (AMI manipulation check) 
A. When you watched the Kraft Peanut Butter ad, did you watch it ... 
As if you wanted to learn about Kraft Peanut Butter? 
1 2 3 4 5 
1-----------------1-----------------1-----------------1-----------------1 
not at all definitely 
Tl 't'(TL ___ ---~; ---~4-..-..1-..-......l .. t... ....... v ......... .C-4- n~.-..-,,-1- D,,++-...... n.rl rt;rl "'l7AH nrnt,...h ~t 
D. VY llt;ll yvu WdllAic;u lHc; .Lllall .L i..,auuL LJULLvl au, u1u yvu vvu.cvu n ••• 
As if you wanted to learn the benefits of Kraft Peanut Butter? 
1 2 3 4 5 
1-----------------1-----------------1-----------------1-----------------1 
not at all definitely 
C. When you watched the Kraft Peanut Butter ad, did you watch it. .. 
As if you wanted to learn what Kraft Peanut Butter had to offer? 
1 2 3 4 5 
1-----------------1-----------------1-----------------1-----------------1 
not at all definitely 
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2. (Thoughts produced during viewing) 
What were you thinking about during the ad? In the space below, write down all the things 
you were thinking about during the ad. 
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3. (Argument Recognition) 
Please read the following claims made about Kraft Peanut Butter. Some of these claims 
were in the ad but some were not in the ad. A claim can be either spoken or presented as 
words on the screen. For each claim listed below, please tell me whether it appeared in the 
ad. If you think it DID appear in the ad then circle "1". If you think that it DID NOT 
appear in the ad then circle "2". If you do not know whether it appeared in the ad then 
circle "3" 
A. Tastes heaps better (than oily peanut butter). 
1 2 3 
1----------------------------1----------------------------1 
DID appear in ad DID NOT appear in ad Don't know 
B. Kraft Peanut Butter is nice and crunchy. 
1 2 3 
1----------------------------1----------------------------1 
DID appear in ad DID NOT appear in ad Don't know 
C. Kraft Peanut Butter is never oily and never dry. 
1 2 3 
1----------------------------1----------------------------1 
DID appear in ad DID NOT appear in ad Don't know 
D. Kraft Peanut Butter is really good for you. 
1 2 3 
1----------------------------1----------------------------1 
DID appear in ad DID NOT appear in ad Don't know 
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4. (ARG) 
Here are two claims that appeared in the ad: 
1. Kraft Peanut Butter tastes heaps better than oily peanut butter. 
2. Kraft Peanut Butter is never oily and never dry. 
A. How much do these claims matter? 
1 2 3 4 5 
1-----------------1-----------------1-----------------1-----------------1 
don't matter at all 
B. How much do these claims help you to understand the product? 
1 
1 3 
matter very much 
1-----------------1-----------------1-----------------1-----------------1 
help me 
understand the product a lot 
do not help me understand 
the product at all 
C. How much do these claims make you want the product? 
1 2 3 4 5 
1-----------------1-----------------1-----------------1-----------------1 
do not make me 
want the product at all 
D. Please tell me how much you believe these claims: 
make me want the 
product a lot 
1 2 3 4 5 
1-----------------1-----------------1-----------------1-----------------1 
do not believe them at all believe them a lot 
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5. (PC) 
Please tell me what you thought of the music in the ad: 
A. 1 2 3 4 5 
1-----------------1-----------------1-----------------1-----------------1 
do not like it at all like it a lot 
B. 1 2 3 4 5 
1-----------------1-----------------1-----------------1-----------------1 
boring fun 
c. 1 2 3 4 5 
1-----------------1-----------------1-----------------1-----------------1 
great stupid 
D. 1 2 3 4 5 
1-----------------1-----------------1-----------------1-----------------1 
dull exciting 
Please tell me what you thought of the people in the ad: 
E. 1 2 3 4 5 
1-----------------1-----------------1-----------------1-----------------1 
do not like them at all like them a lot 
F. 1 2 3 4 5 
1-----------------1-----------------1-----------------1-----------------1 
fun boring 
G. 1 2 3 4 5 
1-----------------1-----------------1-----------------1-----------------1 
stupid great 




Please tell me what you thought of the colours in the ad: 
I. 1 2 3 4 5 
1-----------------1-----------------1-----------------1-----------------1 
like them a lot do not like them at all 
J. 1 2 3 4 5 
1-----------------1-----------------1-----------------1-----------------1 
boring fun 
K. 1 2 3 4 5 
1-----------------1-----------------1-----------------1-----------------1 
stupid great 
L. 1 2 3 4 5 
1-----------------1-----------------1-----------------1-----------------1 
dull exciting 
Please tell me what you thought of the action (what happened) in the ad: 
M. 1 2 3 4 5 
1-----------------1-----------------1-----------------1-----------------1 
do not like it at all like it a lot 
N. 1 2 3 4 5 
1-----------------1-----------------1-----------------1-----------------1 
boring fun 
0. 1 2 3 4 5 
1-----------------1-----------------1-----------------1-----------------1 
stupid great 





Please tell me what you think/feel about the ad overall: 
A. 1 2 3 4 5 
1-----------------1-----------------1-----------------1-----------------1 
hate it like it a lot 
B. 1 2 3 4 5 
1-----------------1-----------------1-----------------1-----------------1 
boring fun 
C. 1 2 3 4 5 
1-----------------1-----------------1-----------------1-----------------1 
stupid great 




Please tell me what you think/feel about Kraft Peanut Butter: 
A. 1 2 3 4 5 
1-----------------1-----------------1-----------------1-----------------1 
it is bad it is good 
B. 1 2 3 4 5 
1-----------------1-----------------1-----------------1-----------------1 
very nice not very nice 
c. 1 2 3 4 5 
1-----------------1-----------------1-----------------1-----------------1 
I do not like it at all I love it 
D. 1 2 3 4 5 
1-----------------1-----------------1-----------------1-----------------1 
I think it is useless I think it is really useful 
E. l 2 3 4 5 
1-----------------1-----------------1-----------------1-----------------1 
boring fun 





If your parents asked you what type of peanut butter you wanted, how likely is it that you 
would ask your parents to buy Kraft Peanut Butter? 
Please show your answer on the scale below: 
A. 1 2 3 4 5 
1-----------------1-----------------1-----------------1-----------------1 
not at all likely very likely 
If your parents asked you to buy some peanut butter, ·would you buy Kraft peanut butter? 
Please show your answer on the scale below. 
B. 1 2 3 4 5 
1-----------------1-----------------1-----------------1-----------------1 
definitely buy never buy 
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Appendix 6. Thought Classification Scheme 
Coding Classification 
Relevance of thought 
Relevant 
Irrelevant 











Continued on next page ... 
Definition/Example 
Thoughts connected to advertising or the product class. "I want one." 
Thoughts having no connection to advertising or the product class. "I 
don't like school." 
Thoughts about the specific product. "I think (the product) is cool! 
Thoughts about the product class. "I don't like fizzy drink." 
Thoughts about the specific arguments presented in the ad. "Does 
chocolate really give me more energy?" 
Thoughts about the elements of the execution e.g. music, action. coiours, 
or imagery not connected to central message arguments. "That music 
rocks!" 
Thoughts about the actors or voices in in the ad. "The kids have heaps of 
friends". 
Any thoughts not classified above. 
Restatement or paraphrase of verbal or pictorial ad message. Little or no 
use of prior knowledge. "The fruit drink has a full days supply of vitamin 
C." 
Reactions to, qualifications of, or illustrations of the material in the ad. 
Uses both memory of ad and some prior knowledge. "The robots are 
probably hard to stack" (in the ad the robots are shown stacking 
themselves). 
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Thoughts that express pertinent beliefs not directly traceable to specific 
points in the ad. Use of prior knowledge. "That fruit drink has lots of 
sugar" (sugar not mentioned in the ad). 
Thoughts that express pure affect toward the product, ad, communicator, 
or some other relevant object or issue. "I hate orange juice!" 
Favourable thoughts. "I really like this product" 
Unfavourable thoughts. "I don't like the kids in the ad" 
Thoughts that are neither favourable nor unfavourable. "My friend has 
one." 
Thoughts of any polarity and origin that are targeted toward the product, 
product class, or the message arguments. 
Thoughts of any polarity and origin that are targeted toward the 
executional elements of the ad, the ad communicators, or any other object 
irrelevant to the message arguments. 
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Appendix 7. Examination of data used in path analyses 
Group~~Statistic~Std~error~ 
Younger ARG Skewness -.206 .226 
Kurtosis -.274 .449 
PC Skewness -.482 .226 
Kurtosis -.447 .449 
AAD Skewness -.095 .226 
Kurtosis -.740 .449 
AB Skewness -.224 .226 
Kurtosis -.822 .449 
Pl Skewness .118 .226 
Kurtosis -1.480 .449 
Older ARG Skewness -.481 .250 
Kurtosis .177 .495 
PC Skewness -.253 .250 
Kurtosis -.363 .495 
AAD Skewness -.041 .250 
Kurtosis -.474 .495 
AB Skewness -.025 .250 
Kurtosis -.361 .495 
Pl Skewness .072 .250 
Kurtosis -.9i4 .495 
Tests of Normality 
~-~~-~~ - ~~ ~~~ ~- - -- ~ ~Kolmogor-0v-Smirnov~ -~ - -- ~-~~~ - ~ - -
GR0UP--------Statistic----df---Si~-. -


















* This is a lower bound of the true significance. 
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Std. Dev= .68 
Mean =2.78 
N=93.00 
Sid. Dev= .ea 
Mean =2.80 
N= 93.00 
Std. Dev= 1.03 
Mean=2.n 
N=93.00 
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Appendix 8. Reliability Analysis for multi-item scales used in path analyses 
Evaluations of Central Message Arguments 
Mean Std Dev Cases 
1. ARGEVA 2.9179 1.2611 207.0 
2. ARGEVC 2.8261 1.2690 207.0 
3. ARGEVD 2.8792 1.0883 207.0 
4. ARGEVBR 3.1498 1.1582 207.0 
Correlation Matrix 
ARGEVA ARGEVC ARGEVD ARGEVBR 
ARGEVA 1.0000 
ARGEVC .3732 1.0000 
ARGEVD .2722 .2378 1.0000 
ARGEVBR .3342 .1796 .2416 1.0000 
Reliability Coefficients 4 items 
Alpha = .6019 Standardized item alpha = . 6005 
Evaluations of Peripheral Cues 
Mean Std Dev Cases 
1. MUS CR 3.0495 1.1399 207.0 
2. PP LS CR 2.8998 1.1721 207.0 
3. CLRSCR 3.0797 1.0406 207.0 
4. ACTS CR 3.1256 1.2336 207.0 
Correlation Matrix 
MUS CR PPLSCR CLRSCR ACTS CR 
MUS CR 1.0000 
PPLSCR .6487 1.0000 
CLRSCR .5499 .5491 1.0000 
ACTS CR .6087 .5241 .4252 1.0000 
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Reliability Coefficients 4 items 
Alpha = .8298 Standardized item alpha= .8307 
Attitude Toward the Ad (Aad) 
Mean Std Dev Cases 
1. AADDR 2.9324 1.2942 207.0 
2. AADA 3.0145 1.2903 207.0 
3. AADB 2.9662 1.4017 207.0 
4. AADC 2.8454 1.2715 207.0 
Correlation Matrix 
AADDR AADA AADB AADC 
AADDR 1.0000 
AADA .6547 1.0000 
AADB .5928 .7008 1.0000 
I AADC .6514 .7056 .6970 1.0000 
Reliability Coefficients 4 items 
I Alpha = .8883 Standardized item alpha= .8891 
Attitude Toward the Brand 
Mean Std Dev Cases 
1. ABA 3.2670 1.3763 207.0 
2. ABC 3.0485 1.3353 207.0 
3. ABD 2.9709 1.2761 207.0 
4. ABE 2.9854 1.3233 207.0 
5. ABBR 3.0922 1.3127 207.0 














ABC ABD ABE ABBR 
1.0000 
.5791 1.0000 
.6078 .6006 1.0000 
.7210 .5287 .5035 1.0000 
.6407 .6260 .5966 .5378 
Reliability Coefficients 6 items 
Standardized item alpha= .9058 










PJBR .7074 1.0000 
Reliability Coefficients 2 items 











































































Appendix 10. Critical ratios for differences between parameters 
The table below reports critical ratios for pair wise comparisons between groups on 
specified parameters. Critical ratios> 1.645 are significant at the .05 level (one-tail) and 
significant at the .10 level (one-tail) if> 1.282. Entries are bolded if significant or 
approaching significance. NI A refers to a comparison that is not available due to one or 
both of the parameters being non-existent (non-significant). Fig ? displays an example of a 
full model with parameter labels. 
Example of full model with parameter labels 
ARG 
PC 
n 1ca ra 10s or pairwise comparisons o groups on s C "f l f t f r>ec1 IC I r>arame ers Td t 
PC-t Aad (P1) 1Y) AS/HV (Y) AS/LV (Y) UAS/HV (Y) UAS/LV (0) AS/HV (0) AS/LV (Ol UAS/HV (0) UAS/LV 
(Y) AS/HV * * * * * * * * 
(Y) AS/LV -0.08 * * * * * * * 
(Y) UAS/HV 0.537 0.571 * * * * * * 
(Y) UAS/LV 2.657 2.506 2.782 * * * * * 
(0) AS/HV 1.372 -1.324 -1.163 1.616 * * * * 
i(O) AS/LV 0.241 0.308 0.417 3.097 -1.525 * * * 
(0) UAS/HV 1.155 1.126 0.874 1.942 -0.308 1.254 * * 
(0) UAS/LV 1.548 1.475 1.417 -1.556 0.151 1.803 0.485 * 
ARG-tAad (P2) 'Y) AS/HV (Y) AS/LV (Y) UAS/HV (Y) UAS/LV (0) AS/HV (0) AS/LV (0) UAS/HV (0) UAS/LV 
Y) AS/HV * * * * * * * * 
Y) AS/LV N/A * * * * * * * 
Y) UAS/HV N/A N/A * * * * * * 
Y) UAS/LV N/A N/A N/A * * * * * 
(0) AS/HV N/A N/A N/A N/A * * * * 
0) AS/LV N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A * * * 
'O) UAS/HV N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A * * 
'0) UAS/LV N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A * 
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PC-7Ab (P3) (V) AS/HV (V) AS/LV (V) UAS/HV (V) UAS/LV (Q) AS/HV (Q) AS/LV (Q) UAS/HV (0) UAS/LV 
'V) AS/HV * * * * * * * * 
1V) AS/LV U25 * * * * * * * 
'V) UAS/HV -2.351 -2.869 * * * * * * 
(V) UAS/LV 0.446 -0.704 2.543 * * * * * 
'Q) AS/HV N/A N/A N/A N/A * * * * 
'Q) AS/LV N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A * * * 
IQ) UAS/HV N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A * * 
1Q) UAS/LV N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A * 
ARG-7Ab (P7) 'V) AS/HV (V) AS/LV (V) UAS/HV (V) UAS/LV (Q) AS/HV (Q) AS/LV (Q) UAS/HV (Q) UAS/LV 
(V) AS/HV * <- * * * * * * 
'V) AS/LV -3.554 * * * * * * * 
1V) UAS/HV 0.939 4.82 * * * * * * 
'V) UAS/LV -0.571 3.564 -1.787 * * * * * 
'Q) AS/HV -0.46 -3.395 1.552 -0.087 * * * * 
l(Q) AS/LV N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A * * * 
1Q) UAS/HV 0~087 3.446 -0.783 -0.629 0.524 N/A * * 
1Q) UAS/LV N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A * 
PC-7 Pl (P6) V) AS/HV (V) AS/LV (V) UAS/HV (V) UAS/LV (Q) AS/HV (Q) AS/LV (Q) UAS/HV (Q) UAS/LV 
,(V) AS/HV * * * * * * * * 
1V) AS/LV N/A * * * * * * * 
1V) UAS/HV N/A N/A * * * * * * 
(V) UAS/LV N/A N/A N/A * * * * * 
(Q) AS/HV N/A N/A N/A N/A * * * * 
(Q) AS/LV N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A * * * 
(0) UAS/HV N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A * * 
(Q) UAS/LV N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A * 
ARG-7 Pl (P5) 1V) AS/HV (V) AS/LV (V) UAS/HV (V) UAS/LV (Q) AS/HV (Q) AS/LV (Q) UAS/HV (Q) UAS/LV 
(V) AS/HV * * * * * * * * 
(V) AS/LV N/A * * * * * * * 
(V) UAS/HV N/A 0.076 * * * * * * 
(V) UAS/LV N/A -0.109 -0.179 * * * * * 
(Q) AS/HV N/A N/A N/A N/A * * * * 
(0) AS/LV N/A 0.003 0.075 -0.116 N/A * * * 
(Q) UAS/HV N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A * * 
(Q) UAS/LV N/A -0.077 -0.144 0.021 N/A -0.082 N/A * 
Aad-7Ab (P4) 'V) AS/HV (V) AS/LV (V) UAS/HV (V) UAS/LV (Q) AS/HV (Q) AS/LV (Q) UAS/HV (Q) UAS/LV 
(V) AS/HV * * * * * * * * 
V) AS/LV N/A * * * * * * * 
V) UAS/HV N/A N/A * * * * * * 
'V) UAS/LV N/A N/A N/A * * * * * 
'Q) AS/HV N/A N/A N/A N/A * * * * 
1Q) AS/LV N/A N/A N/A N/A -0.754 * * * 
IQ) UAS/HV N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.264 -0.498 * * 
(Q) UAS/LV N/A N/A N/A N/A -0.53 -0.348 -0.209 * 
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Aad~PI CP9) (Y) AS/HV (Y) AS/LV (Y) UAS/HV (Y) UAS/LV (0) AS/HV (0) AS/LV (0) UAS/HV (0) UAS/LV 
(Y) AS/HV * * * * * * * * 
Y) AS/LV 0.467 * * * * * * * 
Y) UAS/HV N/A N/A * * * * * * 
'Y) UAS/LV N/A N/A N/A * * * * * 
'0) AS/HV N/A N/A N/A N/A * * * * 
(0) AS/LV 0.336 -0.065 N/A N/A N/A * * * 
'0) UAS/HV N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A * * 
0) UAS/LV N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A * 
Ab~PI (PB) (Y) AS/HV (Y) AS/LV (Y) UAS/HV (Y) UAS/LV (0) AS/HV (0) AS/LV (0) UAS/HV (0) UAS/LV 
(Y) AS/HV * * * * * * * * 
Y) AS/LV N/A * * * * * * * 
Yl UAS/HV -1.217 N/A * * * * * * 
(Y) UAS/LV -0.69 N/A 0.668 * * * * * 
0) AS/HV -0.994 N/A 0.254 -0.406 * * * * 
0) AS/LV -2.131 N/A 0.613 1.589 0.949 * * * 
0) UAS/HV -1.462 N/A -0.026 0.848 0.325 0.737 * * 
0) UAS/LV -1.449 N/A -0.106 -0.872 0.388 0~566 -0.098 * 
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